Court Fee Law
Frequently Asked Questions on Court Fee Law
Ans. The earliest legislation on court-fees was by Regulations in the Presidencies of Bengal in 1795, Madras in 1782 and Bombay in 1802. The first Court-fees Act was Act 36 of 1860, which was replaced by Act 10 of 1862, which was again replaced by Act 26 of 1867. The present Act, viz., 7 of 1870, was passed in 1870 and replaced the Act 26 of 1867. Since then the Act has been amended from time to time by Acts 20 of 1870, 8 of 1871, 15 of 1872, 13 of 1875, 11 of 1899, 10 of 1901, 5 of 1905, 7 of 1910, 14 of 1911, 19 of 1922, and by AO 1937, AO 1950, AO (No. 2), 1956, AO (No. 3), 1956.
The Court-fees Act is not exhaustive on the subject. Act is divided into seven Chapters. Chapter-I consists of sections 1 and 2 only, as preliminary; Chapter-II covers three sections i.e. Section 3 to 5 which deal fees in High Courts and the Courts of Small Causes at Presidency towns. Chapter-III covers Sections 6 to 19 deals with fees in other Courts and in public offices and some of its sections are also applicable to appeals before High Court. Chapter III-A of Act deals with probates, letter of administration, consisting sections 19-A to 19-K. Chapter IV deals with process fee and Chapter-V with mode of levying the fee and Chapter VI is Miscellaneous.
Besides these seven Chapters there are three Schedules, giving certain tables of fees etc. Schedules I and II give comprehensive classification of various kinds of suits with reference to subject matter or relief claimed along with table of fee payable. Schedules also provide that the fees payable on some documents shall vary according to court in which they are filed. Again in Schedule-II it is declared that plaints and appeals in the suits specified therein shall bear the fixed fee prescribed while Schedule I specifies certain suits in which plaint and appeals shall bear an ad-valorem fees.
Ans. Scope and Object of the Act
The Court-fees Act, as its name signifies, is an Act primarily passed for the purpose of prescribing the fees which are to be paid in respect of documents to be used in courts. The Act has no preamble whereby its purpose can be ascertained, but there can be no manner of doubt that one of its main purposes is to levy fees for services to be rendered by the courts and public offices.
The Act is a fiscal enactment having for its primary object the protection of revenue and not to coerce the subject. The Act not only prescribes the fees but also provides how these fees are to be ascertained or determined, and the conditions under which the documents included in the First and Second Schedules to the Act may be received, filed, registered or used, as the case may be, in the courts in India. The Act also specifies the documents which need not be stamped under the Act for the purpose of being used in the courts.
In Chandranani Koer v. Basudev Narain Singh, 49 IC 442, it was observed - It is intended not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality but to secure revenue to the State. This is evident from the character of the Act, and is brought out by Section 12, which makes the decision of the first Court as to value final as between the parties and enables the Court of appeal to correct any error as to this, only where the first Court decided to the detriment of revenue.
Ans. The drafting of this Act is somewhat unscientific and its interpretation certainly gives some difficulty. The following rules of construction are deduced from decided cases :-
1. A fiscal statute, like the Court-fees Act, must be strictly construed. Liability or additional liability cannot be imposed on the subject except by clear and unambiguous terms. In other words, unless the language of the Act is clear and unambiguous so as to entitle the Courts to levy higher duty on a relief, it must be construed very strictly, and not in a manner that would result in demanding more court-fee for a less valuable claim.
2. In case of doubt, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the subject.
3. If two constructions of a final enactment are equally possible and reasonable, the construction more favourable to the subject be enforced.
In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commr. Sales Tax Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207, it was observed - It is also a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. 3-A. The provisions of the Court-fees Act must be interpreted strictly and any demand of court-fee which must necessarily be deemed to be in furtherance of the provisions of the Act must be strictly scrutinised. In Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijay Singh Ji Spinning & Weaving Mills, AIR 1961 SC 1549, it was observed - In construing a statute, there are two well-established rules -(i) Where the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves in such case best declare the intention of the legislature.
(ii) Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system, which the statute purports to be regulating, and that alternative is to be rejected, which will introduce uncertainty, friction, or confusion into the working of the system.
Ans. Retrospective effect of the Act. - The general rule is that the statutes are prospective and not retrospective in their operation. They are retrospective when -
(a) the Legislature has expressly declared them to be retrospective; or
(b) they affect only the procedure of the Courts.
The Court-fees Act is not retrospective in its operation. The law of court-fees is a procedural law. Hence the court-fee payable on a plaint is to be determined with reference to the law in force at the time of the institution of the suit, although the law in force at the time of the accrual of the cause of action might have been different. But even procedural law cannot have a retrospective operation so as to affect things already done in a pending proceeding. Thus a change in law as to court-fee subsequent to the institution of the suit and before its disposal cannot affect the court-fee payable on the plaint in the suit (Chunni Lal v. Krishna Das Ram Das, A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 71; Tara Prasanna v. Trisinghu Moorari, A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 731). Where the court-fee for and an appeal or application for review is made to depend on the value of the plaint in the case and there is a change in the law of court-fee subsequent to the institution of the suit and before the appeal or application for review is filed, the value of the plaint for the purpose of determining the court-fee on such appeal or application must be fixed with reference to the law in force at the time of the institution of the suit and not at the time of the filing of the appeal or application. (Chhakauri Singh v. Sri Krishna Pande, A.I.R. 1941 All. 134 : 193 I.C. 747; Nand Ram v. Jogendra Chandra, A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 881).
Ans. Question of court-fee. - The question of court-fee should be determined at the earliest possible opportunity. If, on examining the plaint, the Court finds that the relief claimed is under-valued, it should require the plaintiff to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, and if he fails to do so, the plaint should be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the matter requires investigation, the Court should record the evidence of the parties bearing on the point and if it finds that the court-fee paid is insufficient, it should stay further proceedings in the suit and require the plaintiff to make good the deficiency within a specified time and on his failure to do so, it should dismiss the suit under Section 10, Court-fees Act.
Determination of the nature of suits. - It is the allegation in the plaint that determines the court-fee payable in a suit. It is not to be determined upon the pleas taken by the defendant, but upon the frame, the scope, the intention and the object of the plaintiff. While valuing a suit, attention is to be confined to the plaint alone and should not be paid to other circumstances subsequently influencing the judgment of the Court, as to the value of the relief sought.
For purposes of calculation of court-fee, the Court must take the allegations in the plaint to be prima facie correct, and a plaintiff is entitled to insist that the court-fee should be assessed on the basis on which he has framed his plaint although there might be room for suspicion that the plaint has been so drafted as to avoid inconvenient facts and the payment of a higher court-fee.
Supreme Court in S. Chettiar v. R. Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 has observed that question of court-fee must be considered in the light of allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced by either the plea in written statement or the final decision of the suit on merits.
Ans. Section 3 of the Court-fees Act provides :-
The fees payable for the time being to the clerks and officers (other than the sheriffs and attorneys) of the High Courts established by Letters Patent by virtue of the power conferred by section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 or section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 or section 229 of the Government of India Act, 1935;
or chargeable in each of such courts under No. 11 of the first, and Nos. 7, 12, 14, 20 and 21 of the second Schedule to this Act annexed;
and the fees for the time being chargeable in the Courts of Small Causes at the Presidency towns and their several offices, shall be collected in manner hereinafter appearing." Thus section 3 merely prescribes the mode of collection of fees and is not a charging section. It deals with the court-fees payable in the Chartered High Courts and Presidency Small Cause Courts. Section 4 also deals with the court-fees to be paid in chartered High Courts.
The section is divided mainly into two parts. The first part consists of two paragraphs which concern the fees payable or chargeable in High Courts, other than those of Kerala, Mysore and Rajasthan, and the second part concerns the Courts of Small Causes at the Presidency-towns and their offices, and the fees for the time being chargeable in those courts and the offices. But both the parts have got one common object, namely, the manner in which collection of the fees payable or chargeable has to be made. According to Section 3, the procedure laid down in Sections 25 to 28 infra for the collection and mode of levying the fees applies to the original jurisdiction as well as the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court; but it is not applicable to Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a single judge of the High Court and no court-fee is leviable thereon except Rs. 2/- prescribed for an application of the High Court. Section 3 does not apply to appeals under Agency Rules referred by the Government to the High Court for disposal.
Ans. Section 4 of Court-fees Act provides :-
No document of any of the kinds specified in the Schedule I or II to this Act annexed, as chargeable with fees, shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by any of the said High Courts in any case coming before such Court in the exercise of its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction;
or in the exercise of its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction;
In their appellate jurisdiction.
or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the judgments (other than judgments passed in the exercise of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court) of one or more Judges of the said court, or of a division court;
or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subject to its superintendent;
As Courts of Reference and Revision.
or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a court of reference or revision;
In th exercise of jujrisdiction to issu writs, etc.
unless in respect of such document there be paid as fee an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document.
This section is imperative and enacts that no document of any kind shall be received unless it bears court-fees of the requisite value and provides that all documents mentioned in the first and the second Schedules annexed to this Act can only be filed, exhibited or recorded in or received or furnished by any of the High Courts in the exercise of its :-
1. Extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction;
2. Extraordinary original civil jurisdiction;
3. Appellate jurisdiction against judgment of two or more Judges of High Court or Division Bench;
4. Appellate jurisdiction over subordinate Courts;
5. Revisional jurisdiction and as Court of Reference, when the proper court-fees prescribed by those Schedules for such documents have been paid.
Ans. Section 5 of Court-fees Act provides :-
When any difference arises between the officer, whose duty it is to see that any fee is paid under this chapter, and any suitor or attorney, on the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof, the question shall, when the difference arises in any of the said High Courts, be referred to the Taxing Officer, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice of such High Court, or of such Judge of High Court as the Chief Justice shall appoint, either generally or specially, on this behalf.
When any such difference arises in any of the said Courts of Small Causes, the question shall be referred to the clerk of the court, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the first Judge of such Court.
The Chief Justice shall declare who shall be the taxing officer within the meaning of the first paragraph of this section.
The section is divided into three paragraphs of which paras 1 and 3 concern the High Court and para 2 concerns the Courts of Small Causes in the Presidency towns. It prescribes the procedure in case of difference between the officer concerned of the said courts and the suitor or attorney as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof and how the difference is to be resolved. Such difference is resolved by referring the matter to the taxing officer in the case of High Courts and to the clerk of the court in case of Presidency Small Causes Courts. The taxing officer or the clerk of the court, as the case may be, may also refer the matter when, in his opinion, the question is one of general importance, to the Chief Justice of the High Court or the first Judge of the Court, as the case may be. The Chief Justice has been given the power to declare who shall be the taxing officer within the meaning of this section.
To attract the application of the section it is necessary that there should be, in the first instance, a difference of opinion between the officer whose duty is to see that the proper court-fee is paid and any suitor or attorney as to the fee payable, and, secondly, there should be a reference to the taxing officer who should give a decision on the question raised. Unless the question is raised before the taxing officer, and he brings his mind to bear on the question, the section will not apply.
Ans. Chapter III of Court-fees Act comprising sections 6 to 9 deals law relating to Court-fees in other courts than High Court or Courts of Small Causes in Presidency Towns. Section 6 of Act provides general rule in this regard.
Section 6 of Act provides :- Except in the Courts hereinbefore mentioned, no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the First or Second Schedule to this Act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice, or shall be received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document.
This section relates to Courts other than those mentioned in Section 4 and also to public offices, and makes a provision, similar to that contained in Section 4 for such Courts and offices. It forbids such Courts and offices to receive or furnish any document unless it has been properly stamped. The section enjoins the Courts to see whether a document presented before it is sufficiently stamped. The Court can go into the question of insufficiency or otherwise of the court-fee by looking into the allegations in the plaint. If a substantive relief is claimed, though clothed in the garb of a declaratory decree with a consequent relief, the Court is entitled to see what is the real nature of the relief and if satisfied that it is not a mere consequential relief but a substantive relief, it can demand the proper court-fee on that relief, irrespective of the arbitrary valuation put by the plaintiff in the plaint on the ostensible consequential relief.
In Raghunath Ganesh v. Vaman Vasudev, AIR 1950 Bom. 234. It was observed :- This section should be read along with Section 28, which in a way supplements it. Section does not control the application of Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code. Any conflict that is likely to arise between Sections 4 and 6 of the Court-fees Act and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure is resolved by Section 8. When an insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal comes before the Court, it falls to be dealt with under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code, and Section 28, Court-fees Act. The Court can reject the same or merely return it. In either case the appellant is entitled to present a fresh memorandum of appeal on sufficient court-fee.
Ans. Scope of Section - This section has to be read along with the Schedules which are supplementary and not alternative to this section and other sections of the Act. The section states the various processes by which the values in different suits are to be ascertained and Schedule I applies the proper court-fee to these values payable either on plaint or memorandum of appeal.
Schedules I and II endeavour to give a comprehensive classification of the various kinds of suits with reference to these heads of classification. The Schedules also provide that the proper fee payable on some documents shall vary according to the courts in which they are filed and that in regard to others there shall be no such variance. Again, in Schedule II, it is declared that plaints and appeals in the suits therein specified shall bear the fixed fees prescribed. In Schedule I are specified various suits in which plaints and memorandum of appeals shall bear an ad valorem fee. In short, the section purports to deal with the method of computation of court-fees payable in various classes of suits mentioned in its several clauses.
General Rules - It has already been noticed while considering Sections 4 and 6 that a plaint is a document which has got to be stamped with the court- fee either under Schedule I or Schedule II of the Act. These two Schedules categorise suits into different groups in respect of which either an ad valorem fee as provided by Schedule I or a fixed fee as provided by Schedule II is payable. So the first thing to be done in this connection is to find out under which of the two Schedules the suit falls.
The first rule to be observed in determining the court-fee payable in any suit is to ascertain the nature of the suit with reference to the different provisions contained in different clauses to this section read with Schedule I or Schedule II.
The second rule with regard to the determination of the category of a suit for computation of court-fee is that the allegations and prayers of the plaint are to be looked into and in this regard such allegations are to be assumed to be correct.
The third rule to be observed is that the court has to look beyond the mere form and verbiage of the plaint and to arrive at what is the real substance of the claim.
Ans. Mode of Computation of Court-fees.- Section 7 of the Court-fees Act deals with the mode of computation of the court-fees payable in the various classes of suits and appeals mentioned in it. It contemplates three modes of valuation of the subject-matter of a suit, which are as follows :-
1) Valuation according to its actual or market value, in other words, the market value of the subject-matter determines the amount of court- fee payable.
2) By ascribing to the subject-matter an artificial value based simply on certain fixed rules of calculation.
3) Notional valuation, or valuation at the option of the plaintiff, that is to say, by requiring the plaintiff himself to value the relief he seeks.
Section 7 has to be read along with the Schedules. Schedules I and II endeavour to give a comprehensive classification of the various kinds of suits with reference to these heads of classification. These Schedules also provides that the proper fees payable on some documents shall vary according to the courts in which they are filed and that in regard to others there shall be no such variance. Again, in Schedule II, it is mentioned that plaints and appeals in the suits therein specified shall bear the fixed fees prescribed, while in Schedule I are specified various suits in which the plaints and appeals shall bear an ad valorem fee. Section 7 is a handle for the application of the Schedules of the Act.
Ans. Computation of Court-fee
(a) In suit for money : Section 7(i) of Act says :-
In suit for money (including suits for damages or compensation or arrears of maintenance, of annuities or of other sums payable periodically) - according to amount claimed.
The scope of this clause extends to all suits for money irrespective of whether the amount recoverable is a fixed sum or by instalments or it recoverable periodically or is secured upon any movable or immovable property. The court-fees payable on such suits should be according to the amount claimed therein.
The object of levying ad valorem court-fee on claims for money is to secure revenue.
(b) In suits for Maintenance and Annuities :
It is provided in section 7(ii) of the Court-fees Act that the amount of fees payable in suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically shall be computed according to the value of the subject-matter of the suits, and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year.
The court-fees under this clause is payable according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit. But this value is not the market value of the subject-matter nor the present value of the payments to be made periodically. It prescribes a special mode of valuation for the purpose of court-fees and lays down that the value of the subject-matter of the suit is to be regarded as being ten times the amount claimed as payable for one year.
Here it is to be noted that the suits for maintenance should be distinguished from suits for arrears of maintenance. The former are valued at the amount claimed as payable for one year under section 7(ii) and the latter at the amount claimed as arrears under Section 7(i).
(c) Suit for Moveable properties having market value :
Section 7(iii) provides : In suit for movable property other than money, where the subject-matter has market value - according to such value at the date of presenting the plaint.
This clause is intended to provide for suits in respect of moveable property (other than money) which has a market value, while suit relating to moveable properties having no market value are covered within scope of clause (iv) (a) of Section 7 of Act.
(ii) Suits for Moveable properties having no market value :
Clause (iv) (a) says in suits for moveable property where the subject- matter has no market value, as for instance, in the case of documents relating to title - according to amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.
In Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245, it was observed :- If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purpose of court-fees. The theoretical basis for this provision appears to be that in a case in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness.
Some Instances - (i) A suit by a mortgagor to obtain possession of the mortgage-deed on the grounds that the sums mentioned therein have not been paid to him.
(ii) A suit by a mortgagor against the mortgagee and his assignee praying for delivery of the mortgage bond with endorsement of full satisfaction.
(iii) A suit by the plaintiff for the return of the sale-deed in his favour or, in the alternative, for the execution of a fresh sale-deed, on the ground that in contravention of a sale by the defendant to the plaintiff, the former sells the property to a third person
(iv) A suit for the cancellation and delivery of a document.
(v) A suit for the cancellation of a document where there is a prayer to the effect that `a document purported to be executed by another person in favour of the plaintiff does not amount to a due fulfilment of the contract.'
(vi) A suit to set aside a trust deed and to recover the amount of the trust money.
(vii) A suit for the removal of the defendant from the management of certain trust funds on the ground of misconduct.
Ans. Section 7 Clause (iv) (b) provides - In suits to enforce right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property shall be computed according to the amount at which relief sought is value in plaint or memorandum of appeal.
Section 7(iv)(b) applies only to those cases where the plaintiff happens to be out of possession of the joint property and prays in the suit filed by him that he should be restored to the possession of his share in that property. A suit for partition by a co-sharer in possession of even a part of the joint property is governed for the purposes of court-fee, by Article 17(vi) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act 1870. This sub-clause does not differentiate between a plaintiff who is in actual possession and one who is merely in constructive possession of the property which is to be partitioned. Partition is the enforcement of the right to share in the joint family estate. This sub-clause is specifically meant to govern suits for the enforcement of the right to share in joint Hindu family estates. Plaintiffs must decide at the outset, the nature of their case and must pay court-fee accordingly. The court-fee cannot be made conditional on the decision in the suit itself.
Ans. Computation of court-fees in suits for declaratory decree with consequential relief : Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act prescribes the amount of fees payable in a suit to obtain a decree or order where consequential relief is prayed. Under this sub-clause the amount of court-fees shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. In such suit the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought.
This sub-clause is applicable to a suit in which having regard to the substance of the plaint it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to obtain a declaratory decree in order to perfect his right to the consequential relief that he claims, for instance, where the plaintiff seeks relief to which he is not entitled unless and until some decree of document of alienation of property is avoided. A suit in which a declaration in that behalf is claimed is within Section 7(iv)(c).
The Court-fees Act, 1870 contemplates suits to obtain declaratory decrees simpliciter and suits to obtain declaratory decrees with consequential reliefs as two distinct categories. While the first category falls under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II, the second one falls under this sub-clause of the clause. Under the former, a fixed court-fee is payable, while in the latter, an ad valorem court-fee on the value of the relief sought is payable.
In Laxman Rao v. Dagubai, AIR 1952 MB 147, it was observed - The court cannot compel a plaintiff to add a prayer for consequential relief and demand ad valorem court-fee on such relief. It can only refuse to grant the declaration asked for if in its opinion consequential relief is necessary.
(ii) Computation of Court-fee in suit to obtain injunction.- Section 7(iv)(d) of the Court-fees Act provides that the amount of fee payable in a suit to obtain an injunction shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. In such a suit the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought.
An injunction is a specific order of the court forbidding the commission of a wrong threatened, or the continuance of a wrongful course of action already begun or in some cases (when it is called a mandatory injunction) commanding active restitution of the former state of things. Thus injunctions may be preventive or mandatory. Preventive injunction may be temporary or perpetual.
This clause (iv) (d) applies to those suits in which a perpetual injunction is claimed. It is only in such a case that a decree is necessary and when this clause says of a suit to obtain in an injunction, it speaks of a suit to obtain a decree for injunction. Therefore, a suit in which an application is made under Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code for grant of temporary injunction, does not fall under this clause merely because such an application is made. But where the suit itself is for an injunction, this clause will come into operation whether the injunction sought for is preventive or mandatory.
In suits under this clause, the injunction must be a substantive relief. It may be the sole relief prayed for in the suit or may be coupled with some other relief. In either case, this clause will apply to the prayer for injunction.
The relief of injunction may be asked for as substantive relief in addition to a relief of declaration. Even in such a case this clause will apply and not clause (c).
Illustrations - (1) A suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from erecting permanent structures on the land in suit and for mandatory injunction for the removal of the construction already made alleging that the defendant's interest in the land was not sufficient to entitle him to erect such structures, comes under this clause.
(2) A suit for possession of money bonds and for an injunction restraining defendants from drawing money from the bank, falls under this clause.
(3) A suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from cutting timber from a jungle belonging to the plaintiff, falls under this clause.
(4) A suit to restrain the defendant from opening certain windows in his wall and from preventing or obstructing the plaintiff from building a second storey to his own house, falls under this clause.
Ans. Computation of fees payable in suit for account. - Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act provides as follows :
"The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows :
(iv) In suits -
(f) for accounts - according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.
In such suits, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought."
This sub-clause is intended to provide for all kinds of suits for accounts. A suit is one for accounts and not for money, if the plaint shows that the defendant is an accounting party and that the plaintiff claims on the footing that an account has to be taken to ascertain the sum due to him. But a suit does not necessarily become a suit for accounts because the plaint asks for an account. Suits for partnership accounts and administration suits are also within its purview. Order 7, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure also requires that the plaintiff should approximately state the amount he claims, and clause 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act also enjoins the plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. This amount determines the court-fee as well as the forum, notwithstanding that the plaintiff has through mistake or inadvertance stated the value for the purposes of jurisdiction at a different figure.
Valuation of suits for accounts. - A plaintiff cannot put a value at his choice by simply calling his suit a suit for accounts. He must show that the defendant is an accounting party, i.e., an agent, a trustee, a partner, a mortgagee, a receiver or a bailee in suits for accounts, it is open to the plaintiff to value his suit for the purposes of court-fee at any figures he chooses. The mention of a certain sum in the suit would not change the nature of the suit. Thus a statement in the plaint that the defendant mismanaged and falsified accounts and that the plaintiff sustained loss thereby by a certain amount is still a suit for accounts.
Ans. Computation of court-fees payable in suits for possession of land, houses and gardens. - As provided in Section 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act the amount of fee payable in suit for possession of lands, houses and gardens shall be computed according to the value of the subject-matter. The value of the subject-matter shall be deemed to be ten times the revenue where -
(a) the land forms an entire estate, or definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue; and
(b) such revenue is permanently settled.
The value of land shall be deemed to be five times the revenue payable where -(a) The land forms an entire estate, or definitive share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid; and
(b) such revenue is settled, but not permanently.
The value of land shall be deemed to be fifteen times the net profits where -(a) the land pays no such revenue, or has been partially exempted for such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue; and
(b) the net profits have arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.
The value of the land shall be deemed to be the market value of the land where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate, and is not separately assessed as above mentioned. The word "Estate" means any land subject to the payment of revenue for which proprietor of farmer shall have executed a separate engagement, shall have been separately assessed with revenue. The value of the house or garden shall be deemed to be the market value of the house or garden. In the case of Rani Devi v. Trilok Singh, A.I.R. 1980 All. 111, the plaintiff-respondent claimed himself to be an allottee of the house and not the owner. He also alleged that the defendant-appellant was a trespasser. It was held by Mahavir Singh, J., of the Allahabad High Court that -(a) For suits -
(i) by a tenant against a trespasser, or
(ii) between the rival tenants, the valuation is to be made in accordance with Section 7(V-B) of the Court-fees Act as amended in U.P.
(b) Only in suits is which proprietary possession is claimed, valuation is to be made on market value as given in Section 7 (V-A) of the Act as amended in U.P.
Ans. (a) Computation of Court-fee in suits to enforce pre-emption. Section - 7 Clause (vi) says in suits to enforce a right of pre-emption the court-fee shall be computed according to value (computed in accordance with clause (v) of this section) of the land, house or garden, in respect of which right is claimed.
This clause provides that in suits to enforce right of pre-emption, the Court-fees are payable on the value of the subject-matter (land, houses or garden, as the case may be) in the dispute and such value must be determined in accordance with paragraph (v) of this section. In other words, suits under this clause are governed by Clause (v) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. So if a suit for pre-emption is in respect of the sale of land paying revenue to the Government, the Court-fee should be calculated in accordance with Section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act on the value of such land. If the subject-matter of the suit is a distinct plot and not a definite share of a separately assessed estate, the Court-fee is payable on market-value as provided for in Section 7(v)(d) of the Act.
Value at the date of sale and not at the time of suit determines Court- fee in pre-emption suits. - In a suit for pre-emption when the Court-fee is to be assessed on market value, the market-value at the time of sale is the value for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction, and not the market-value at the time of the suit. Suits for pre-emption stand on different footings, from ordinarily suits for possession.
(b) Computation of Court fee in suits for interest of an Assignee of Land Revenue : Section 7 Clause (vii) of Act says in suits for the interest of an assignee of land revenue the court-fee shall be computed on fifteen times his net profits as such for the next year before date of presenting plaint.
(c) Computation of court-fee in suits to set aside attachment. - It is provided in section 7(viii) of the Court-fees Act that the amount of court-fee in the suits to set aside an attachment of land or of an interest in land or revenue shall be calculated according to the amount for which the land or interest was attached : provided that where such amount exceeds the value of the land or interest, the amount of fee shall be calculated as if the suits were for the possession of such land or interest.
In Asit Baran Choudhary v. Prafulla Chandra Bose AIR 1984 Cal. 366, it was observed :- This clause is intended to provide for suit to set aside (i) an attachment of land, or (ii) attachment of an interest in land, or (iii) attachment of an interest in revenue. But a person suing to set aside an attachment of land or an interest therein, shall in no case be called upon to pay a higher fee than he would have to pay, if he were suing for the possession of the land or interest. A person whose land is attached cannot be compelled to resort to an application under Order 21, Rule 58, of the Civil Procedure Code, for he is at liberty, if he so desires, to commence his litigation by a regular suit independently of the summary provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code, and this clause would apply to such a suit. Similarly, this clause would be equally applicable to cases, where the summary provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be invoked, as for instance, in attachments by revenue officers for the recovery of rent or land revenue. So an attachment of land or any interest therein under the Civil Procedure Code, when it is not followed by a summary decision under Order 21, Rule 58 or attachment by Revenue Officers or Courts without any summary decision, are attachments contemplated by this clause, and suits to set aside such attachments are governed by Section 7(VII) of the Court-fees Act. But this clause does not apply to suits under Order 21, Rule 63 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such a suit is one to alter or set aside a summary decision or order of Civil Court not established by Letters Patent within the meaning of Article 17(i) of the second Schedule, and is consequently governed by that article.
Ans. Section 7(ix) of Court-fee Act provides - "In suits against a mortgages for recovery of property mortgaged to foreclose; and in suits by a mortgage to foreclose the mortgage, or where the mortgage is made by conditional sale, to have the sale declared absolute -
according to principal money expressed to be secured by the instrument of mortgage."
The clause provides for three classes of suits, viz,
(i) suit against a mortgagee for recovery of the property mortgaged,
(ii) suit by a mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, and
(iii) suit, where the mortgage is made by conditional sale, to have the sale declared absolute.
In all these three cases the valuation of the suits has to be made according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the mortgage deed. The application of the clause is not confined to any particular kind of mortgage. A suit for redemption of a simple mortgage is within the purview of this clause. The first part of the clause applies not only to suits for redemption but to all suits against the mortgagee for the recovery of mortgaged property. Even a suit for redemption, where one of the questions at issue is whether the mortgage money is paid off, and if not what is the amount remaining due, is within the ambit of the clause. Similarly, where the main relief claimed in the suit is one for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, but the plaintiff prays that the mortgagee should account for surplus deficiencies caused by him during the course of his management of the mortgaged property, the suit is substantially one for redemption and the court-fee is leviable under this clause, and no separate fee is required in respect of the prayer for account regarding surplus deficiencies. But where a distinct relief in addition to that of redemption is claimed, separate court- fee in respect of it has to be paid. A suit for redemption of a mortgage and mesne profit is, however, not a suit including two or more `distinct subjects' and falls within this clause. The following are some instances where suits have been held not to fall under this clause :(i) A suit to enforce a mortgage by a decree for sale.
(ii) A suit by the purchaser of the equity of redemption to get rid of a decree obtained by the collusion of the mortgagor and the mortgagee for a larger amount than what is due.
(iii) A suit for redemption of a pledge.
(iv) A suit where a mortgagee seeks to recover possession of the mortgaged land, or to recover money on the basis of a mortgage.
Ans. Computation of court-fees in suits for specific performance. - As provided in clause (x) of section 7 of the Court-fees Act the amount of court-fee shall be computed in suits for specific performance -
(a) of a contract of sale - according to the amount of consideration;
(b) of a contract of a mortgage - according to the amount agreed to be secured;
(c) of a contract of lease - according to the aggregate amount of the fine or premium (if any) and of the rent agreed to be paid during the first year of the term;
(d) of an award - according to the amount or value of the property in dispute.
So this clause contemplates four classes of cases which are as follows :-(1) In a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale, the court-fee is regulated by the amount of consideration money. [Section 7(x)(a)].
(2) In a suit for specific performance of a contract of mortgage, the court-fee is regulated by the amount agreed to be secured. [Section 7(x)(b)].
(3) In a suit for specific performance of a contract of lease, the court-fee is regulated by the aggregate amount of fine or premium (if any) and of the rent agreed to be paid during the first year of the term. [Section 7(x)(c)].
(4) In a suit for specific performance of an award, the court-fee is regulate by the amount or value of the property in dispute. [Section 7(x)(d)].
The valuation in case of contracts of sale and mortgage will be according to the consideration of the deed of sale or mortgage, as the case may be, in case of lease, such value will be the aggregate of the premium and first year's rent, and in the case of an award, the valuation will be the value or amount of the property in dispute. The clause does not apply to a suit to specifically enforce a contract of guarantee, nor to a suit for a certain share of land on the allegation that the parties thereto had agreed to buy and pay for the land in partnership at an auction and that it was so purchased in the name of the defendants, nor a suit for specific performance of an agreement regarding a trust deed. Similarly, a suit for refund of the sale consideration paid to the vendor, on the allegation that the vendor had practiced fraud on the vendee by suppressing some important facts in connection with the sale, is not one for specific performance of contract, but for cancellation of the sale and, hence, this clause has no application thereto.
Ans. Computation of court-fee in suits between landlords and tenants - In the following suits between landlord and tenant-
(a) for the delivery by a tenant of the counterpart of a lease,
(b) to enhance the rent of a tenant having a right of occupancy,
(c) for the delivery by a landlord of a lease,
(cc) for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant, including a tenant holding over after the tenancy,
(d) to contest a notice of ejectment,
(e) to recover the occupancy of immovable property from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by a landlord, and
(f) for abatement of rent,
the amount of court-fee shall be computed according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for year next before the date of presenting the plaint. [Section 7(xi) of the Court-fees Act]. The above clause governs the suits between landlords and the tenants. Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) relate to suits by landlords against the tenants while the rest of the sub-clauses deal with suits by tenants against the landlords. (a) Computation of Court-fees payable in suit for delivery by a tenant of a counterpart of a lease. - Section 7(xi)(a) of the CourtFees Act provides that the amount of fee payable in suit a for the delivery by a tenant of a counterpart of a lease shall be computed according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. (b) Computation of court-fees payable in suit to enhance the rent of a tenant having a right of occupancy - Section 7(xi)(b) of the Act lays down that the amount of court-fee payable in a suit to enhance the rent of a tenant having a right of occupancy shall be computed according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. Thus this clause applies to suits for enhancement of rent. A suit for commutation of grain rent into money rent of equal value does not fall within this clause (Chinna Thambiar v. Veerappa Naidu, AIR 1924 Mad. 623). This clause does not provide for a suit for assessment of rent which implies that no rent was paid previously by the defendant and such a suit is not governed by this clause. (Dhanakdhari Tiwari v. Mani Sonnr, AIR 1927 Pat. 123). A tenant having a right of occupancy is a tenant having a right to be in actual physical possession of land and does not include a person having a superior interest. A tenure-holder in Bengal is a person having a superior interest and therefore a suit against him for enhancement of rent is not governed by this clause. (c) Computation of fees payable in suit for delivery by landlord of a lease. - Section 7(xi)(c) of the Act states that the amount of fee payable in suit for the delivery by a landlord of a lease shall be computed according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.
Ans. The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to the compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes [or against an award made by a tribunal constituted under the United Provinces Town Improvement Act or any other similar statute - Add in U.P.] shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant.
Section 8 provides for fee on memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1984. The amount of such fee has to be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant.
This is not a charging section in itself and only provides a rule for the computation of the court-fee payable under the Act in appeal from cases mentioned therein on the assumption that an ad valorem court-fee is chargeable, and lays down the principle on which the court-fee is to be calculated. It is true that Schedule II, Article 17(iv) prescribes generally the fee payable in respect of a suit to set aside an award but this section excludes the application of that provision of law to awards in land acquisition cases, on the principle that the special provision overrides the general provision.
In Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh, AIR 1995 SC 1828, it was observed - Ad valorem court-fee, and not a court-fee of Rs. 4 under Article 11, Schedule II, is leviable on a memorandum of appeal from an order accepting the award given by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Similarly, an appeal against an award under Section 11 of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act (11 of 1953) would be governed by Schedule I, Article 1 and would be chargeable with ad valorem court-fee. When the legality was challenged by filing appeal under Section 54, the difference of amount for which appeal was filed, ad valorem court-fees under Section 8 was required to be paid.
Ans. (A) Section 9 of Court-fees Act provides if the court sees reason to think that annual net profits or the market value of any such land, house or garden as is mentioned in Section 7 paras (5) and (6), have or has been wrongly estimated, the court may for the purpose of computing the fee payable in any suit therein mentioned, issue a commission to any proper person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary and to report thereon to the court.
So Section 9 of Act is intended for the protection of revenue payable to State. The Section merely lays down the procedure to be followed when the court is of opinion that the suit has been undervalued. It is open to the court without any evidence on the point to come to a opinion that land in suit is worth more than the value shown in plaint. However court should not without any evidence on the point and without any evidence on the point and without following the procedure prescribed by section or under the law come to conclusion that there has been under valuation in the suit.
In Hari Ram v. Akbar Hussain, 29 All. 749 it was observed :- The issuing of a commission under this section is discretionary. Apart from issuing a commission the court itself can make a judicial inquiry if it is so minded. A Judge is within his rights if he holds the inquiry either himself or by issuing a commission. As a rule, however, an investigation by issuing a commission under the section should be discouraged and should be resorted to only when the investigation cannot be conveniently held by the court in person.
(B) Section 10 of Court-fees Act provide the procedure where Net profits or market value has been wrongly estimated. It provides :-
(i) If in the result of any such investigation the court finds that the net profits or market value have or has been wrongly estimated, the court, if the estimation has been excessive, may in its discretion refund the excess paid as such fee; but if the estimation has been insufficient, the court shall require the plaintiff to pay so much additional fee as would have been payable had the said market value or net profits been rightly estimated.
(ii) In such case the suit shall be stayed until the additional fee is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the court shall fix, the suit shall be dismissed.
(iii) [Omitted].
So section 10 is intended to supplement the section 9 of Act as both sections together provide a machinery for ascertaining the value of the land, house etc. the subject matter of suit, when court thinks that value has been wrongly estimated to the detriment of revenue. In Sakinabi v. Zeenathunnisa, AIR 1999 Kant. 268 it was observed :- The words `such investigation' in cl. (i) refer to any investigation held under Section 9, and are not confined in their application to an investigation by a commissioner. Hence, the section applies where the court itself holds the inquiry. A reading of the section per se reveals that when the dispute arises as to valuation or the sufficiency of the court-fees, it is the duty of the court to determine that question after hearing the parties. When the order impugned has been passed without following the mandatory provisions of law and without indicating what valuation should be and what court-fees should be paid, such an order is without application of mind and amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. It is pertinent to mention that provisions of sections 9 and 10 are analogous to provisions of Order 7 rule 2 of C.P.C. and contemplate stay of suit for a period to enable the plaintiff to pay to make up the deficiency in the court-fee.
Ans. Section 11 of Court-fees Act provides :- In suits for mesne profits or for immovable property and mesne profits, or for an account, if the profits or amount decreed are or is in excess of the profits claimed or the amount at which the plaintiff valued the relief sought, the decree shall not be executed [drawn up in Punjab] until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profits or amount so decreed shall have been paid to the proper officer.
Where the amount of mesne profits is left to be ascertained in the course of the execution of the decree, if the profit so ascertained exceed the profits claimed, the further execution of the decree shall be stayed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profits ascertained is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the Court shall fix, the suit shall be dismissed.
Scope of the Section : This section provides for procedure in case of (a) suit for mesne profits, and (b) suit for possession of immovable property and mesne profits, and (c) suits for accounts. In all these cases, only approximate amount can be stated. The first paragraph of this section provides that if the amount decreed exceeds the amount stated in the plaint, the decree shall not be executed until the excess court-fee shall have been paid to the proper officer. It is not intended by the first part of this section that the Court should fix a time for the payment of the extra court-fee, but the only way left open to the Court to enforce payment of such court-fee is by staying the execution of the decree till such payment is made. The only penalty which the plaintiff incurs in the event of his not paying the court-fee is that he cannot execute the decree until he pays the additional court-fee. The second paragraph of this section deals only with a case where mesne profits are ascertained in execution of the degree. The two paragraphs of this section are mutually exclusive. If the Court proposes to act under the second paragraph, it should ascertain the amount of profits in money and state the additional court-fee payable and fix a reasonable time for its payment. If the excess court-fee is not paid within time the execution of the decree for such profits shall be stayed, and further penalty by way of dismissal of the suit is also provided.
In Ram Gulam Sahu v. Chintaman Singh, 5 Pat. 361 : 7 PLT 313, it was observed - The section contemplates two cases where the additional court- fee has to be taken after the profits have been ascertained. The first paragraph would appear to relate to a case where the profits claimed before the institution of the suit had been ascertained in the trial court, and it provides for payment of a fee upon the excess amount found due, under penalty of having the execution stayed if the fee is not paid. The second paragraph appears to apply to all cases of past or future mesne profits which have been ascertained in execution and it provides for payment of a court-fee upon the excess of the profits so ascertained over and above the amount claimed and paid for in the plaint and the fee payable is the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profit eventually ascertained.
Ans. Decision of question as to valuation. - Section 12 of the Court- fees Act deals with the law relating to the decision of questions as to valuation. it runs as follows :-
"(i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed and such decision shall be final between the parties to the suit.
(ii) But whenever any such suit comes before a court of appeal, reference or revision, if such court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided, to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay so much additional fee would have been payable had the question been rightly decided, and the provisions of section 10(ii) shall apply." The section is intended to protect and safeguard the interest of revenue as is manifest from the second clause of this section which shows how a court of appeal may review the decision of the lower court or when there is a loss of the public revenue. The scheme of the section is to see that the revenue is not defrauded, that the proper fee payable to Government as the price of the trial of the suit has been paid. (1925 M.W.N. 826).
Ans. It was open to the appellant to give up the second relief in appeal and, as the subject-matter of the appeal was of a purely declaratory character, the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped.
The first relief was of a purely declaratory nature and did not involve any consequential relief.
Section 12 of the Court-fees Act does not preclude the Supreme Court or the Appeal Court from considering the correctness of the order of the lower Appellate Court rejecting the appeal on the ground that the memorandum of appeal was not properly stamped.
The finality imposed by section 12 on decisions relating to court-fee attaches only to decisions concerning valuation simpliciter (pure and simple) and does not attach to decisions relating to the category under which a suit or appeal falls for purposes of court-fees.
Hence the appeal is liable to be allowed and the decision of the lower appellate court dismissing the appeal will be set aside. (Nemi Chand v. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., 1952 S.C.J. 674 : (1953) S.C.R. 197 : (1953) 1 M.L.J. 117).
Ans. Section 13 of Court fees Act provides :- If an appeal or plaint, which has been rejected by lower Court on any of the grounds mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure, is ordered to be received, or if a suit is remanded in appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 351 of the same Code for a second decision by the lower Court, the Appellate Court shall grant to the appellant a certificate, authorizing him to receive back from the Collector the full amount of fee paid on the memorandum of appeal :
Provided that if, in the case of a remand in appeal, the order of remand shall not cover the whole of the subject-matter of the suit, the certificate so granted shall not authorize the appellant to receive back more than so much fee as would have been originally payable on the part or parts of such subject-matter in respect whereof the suit has been remanded.
This section provides for those cases in which court-fee is to be refunded. If a plaint or memorandum of appeal is erroneously rejected by the lower Court under Order 7, Rule 11, or under Order 41, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, as the case may be, but is afterwards ordered to be received by the appellate Court, or if a suit which has been disposed of on a preliminary point by the lower Court is remanded in appeal under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this section applies. In remanding such cases, the court-fees paid on the memoranda of appeal are to be refunded. The reason of this provision appears to be that a litigant should not be required to pay court-fee twice for which the mistake or error of the Court and for no fault of his. This section is mandatory. If an appeal is remanded, the Court is bound to grant a certificate for the refund of court-fee.
In Hari Chand v. Baikuntha Nath, 21 I.C. 866 it was observed :- This section contemplates two cases where the court is empowered to order refund of court-fees paid. The cases contemplated are-
(i) Where a memorandum of appeal or plaint has been rejected by the lower court on any of the grounds mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure and the same is ordered to be received by the appellate Court; and
(ii) Where a suit is remanded in appeal on any of the grounds mentioned on O 41, rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appellate court is required, in both the cases, to grant a certificate to the appellant authorizing him to receive back from the revenue authorities the full amount of fee paid on the memorandum of appeal.
Then Section 14 of the Act provides :- Where an application for a review of judgment is presented on or after the ninetieth day from the date of the decree, the Court, unless the delay was caused by the applicant's laches, may, in its discretion, grant him a certificate authorizing him to receive back from the Collector so much of the fee paid on the application as exceeds the fee which would have been payable had it been presented before such day. Scope of the Section - This section is intended to provide for the refund of court-fee, when an application for review is presented to the Court on or after the 90th day from the date of the decree. If an application for review is filed before the 90th day, the applicant need only pay half the court-fee according to Article 5 of the first Schedule. But Article 4 of the same Schedule or memorandum of appeal if it is filed on or after the 90th day. This section empowers the Court to refund the excessive half payable in the latter case, that is, on such an application, when it is presented after the 89th day. The grant of the certificate for refund is discretionary with the Court, and the discretion contemplated by this section is only to be exercised, when there are no laches on the part of the applicant. Thereafter Section 15 of Court-fee Act says :- Where an application for a review of judgment is admitted, and where, on the rehearing, the Court reserves or modifies its former decision on the ground of mistake in law or fact, the applicant shall be entitled to a certificate from the court authorizing him to receive back from the Collector so much of the fee paid on the [application] as exceeds the fee payable on any other application to such Court under the second Schedule to this Act, No. 1, clause (b) or clause (d). But nothing in the former part of this section shall entitle the applicant to such a certificate where reversal or modification is due, wholly or in part, to fresh evidence which might have been produced at the original hearing. In Prohas Kumar v. Nithar Lal, AIR 1924 Cal. 1054 it was observed - In order to attract the operation of Section 15 of the Court-fees Act the conditions requisite are : (i) that there should be an application for review of judgment, (ii) that it should have been admitted, (iii) that on the re- hearing, the Court should have reversed or modified its former decision on the ground of mistake in law or fact, (iv) and that such reversal or modification was not due to fresh evidence which might have been produced at the original hearing. If the conditions mentioned above are present in a case refund should be ordered though the Court purported to act under Section 151 instead of Order 47, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ans. Section 17 of the Court-fees Act provides :- "Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaint or memorandum of appeal in suits, embracing separately each of such subjects, would be liable under this Act.
Nothing in the former part of this section shall be deemed to affect the power conferred by Code of Civil Procedure, Section 9.
The section enacts that where a suit covers two or more distinct subjects, the court-fee payable thereon would be the aggregate amount of the fees which would be payable as if they were separate suits. The second paragraph of the section keeps the powers of the court intact as provided by rule 6 of Order 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, viz., to order separate trials or to pass such orders in respect of such suits as may be found expedient.
To attract the application of this section the suit must embrace two distinct subjects, or causes of action. In estimating the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal, what the court has to see is not whether the appeal embraces two or more subjects but whether the suit does.
Instances of cases embracing `distinct subjects' within the meaning of Section 17 :-
(a) Suit for partition and possession : Where plaintiffs are not in possession of properties sought to be partitioned and suit of plaintiff was one for joint possession and partition, it was held that suit embraces two distinct cause of action and are within purview of Section 17 of Court-fees Act (AIR 1924 Pat. 558).
(b) Suit for partition and accounts : Such suit must bear court-fee for partition and ad valorem court-fee on the tentative valuation for accounts separately.
(c) Suit for possession of House and Rent : Suit for possession of house and for rent and also for future rent from date of foreclosure to date of delivery of possession is suit with distinct subjects.
(d) Mortgage suit : A suit to enforce two mortgages in favour of the plaintiff from the same mortgagor hypothecating the same properties, and even when the due dates in both is the same embraces two distinct subjects. The causes of action on both of the bonds are separate, for there is nothing to prevent the mortgagee plaintiff from suing on the first mortgage without joining the second mortgage and vice-versa. (AIR 1924 Pat. 77 and AIR 141 Rang. 95).
(e) A suit on the basis of separate hundis : A suit on the basis of three separate hundis executed by one of the defendants in favour of the other defendants on the same day and assigned by the latter to the plaintiff was held to embrace "distinct subjects" and the plaint was chargeable with the aggregate amount of fees payable in a suit on each of the hundis, as each of them constituted a separate cause of action. (AIR 1923 All. 306).
Q. 28. What is the fee chargeable on a complaint relating to cognizable and non-cognizable offence ?
Ans. Fees chargeable on complaint. - Section 18 of the Court-fees Act enacts and prescribes the fee chargeable on the first or the only examination of a complaint by a Magistrate when the offence complained of is either a non-cognizable offence or if cognizable is one of wrongful confinement or wrongful restraint and the complainant has not presented a petition with the prescribed Court-fee. The section is intended to make a provision of charging of court-fee in the case of oral complaints concerning non-cognizable offences and two of the cognizable offences and thereby safeguards the interest of public revenue. A complaint regarding illegal seizure of cattle under the Cattle Trespass Act has been held to fall under this section. (8 B.H.C.R. 22).
The above section lays down that when the first or only examination of a person who complains of the offence of wrongful confinement or of wrongful restraint or of any offence other than an offence for which police officers may arrest without a warrant, and who has not already presented a petition on which a fee has been levied under this Act, is reduced to writing under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant shall pay a fee of eight annas, unless the court thinks fit to remit such payment.
Ans. Exemption of certain documents - Section 19 of the Court-fees Act expressly provides the exemption of certain documents from payment of court- fee. The documents not chargeable with court-fee under this section are as follows :-
(i) Power of attorney to institute or defend a suit when executed by an officer of any of the Armed Forces of the Union not in civil employment.
(ii) Written statements called for by the court after the first hearing of suit.
(iii) Plaints in suits tried by village Munsifs in the presidency of Fort St. George.
(iv) Plaints and process in suits before District Panchayats in the same presidency.
(v) Plaints in suits before Collectors under Madras Regulation, XII of 1816.
(vi) Probate of a will, letters of administration, and, save as regard debts and securities, a certificate under Bombay Regulation, VIII of 1927, where the amount or value of the property in respect of which the probate or letters or certificate shall be granted does not exceed one thousand rupees.
(vii) Application or petition to a Collector or other officer making a settlement of land revenue or to a Board of Revenue or a Commissioner of Revenue relating to matter connected with the assessment of land or the ascertainment of rights thereto or interests therein, if presented previous to the final confirmation of such settlement.
(viii) Application relating to a supply for irrigation of water belonging to Government.
(ix) Application for leave to extend cultivation or to relinquish land, when presented to an officer of land revenue by a person holding under direct engagement with Government, land of which the revenue is settled, but not permanently.
(x) Application for service of notice of relinquishment of land or of enhancement of rent.
(xi) Written authority to an agent to distrain.
(xii) First application (other than a petition containing a criminal charge or information) for the summons of a witness or other person to attend either to give evidence or to produce a document, or in respect of the production or filing of an exhibit not being an affidavit made for the immediate purpose of being produced in court.
(xiii) Bail bonds in criminal cases, recognizances to prosecute or give evidence, and recognizances for personal appearance or otherwise.
(xiv) Petition, application, charge or information respecting any offence when presented, made or laid to or before a public officer, or to or before the heads of villages or the village police in the territories respectively subject to the State Governments of Madras and Bombay.
(xv) Petition by a prisoner, or other person in duress or under restraint of any Court or its officers.
(xvi) Complaint of a public servant (as defined in the Indian Penal Code), a Municipal Officer, or an officer or servant of the Railways.
(xvii) Application for permission to cut timber in Government forests, or otherwise relating to such forests.
(xviii) Application for the payment of money due by Government to the applicant.
(xix) Petition of appeal against the Chaukidari Assessment under Act No. XX of 1836, or against any Municipal tax.
(xx) Application for compensation under any law for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of property for public purposes.
(xxi) Petition presented to the Special Commissioner appointed under Bengal Act No. 2 of 1869 (to ascertain, regulate and record certain tenures in Chhota Nagpur).
(xxii) Petition under the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, Section 45 and 48.
The above section enumerates the documents expressly exempted from payment of court-fee. Apart from this no document that is not mentioned in Schedule requires any Court-fee. [Nagu v. Yeknath, 5 Bom. 400].
Ans. (i) Relief where too high a court-fee has been paid .- Where any person on applying for the probate of a will or letters of administration has estimated the property of the deceased to be of greater value than the same has afterwards proved to be, and has consequently paid too high a court-fee thereon, if, within six months after the true value of the property has been ascertained, such person produces the probate or letters to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority for the local area in which the probate or letters has or have been granted,
and delivers to such Authority a particular inventory and valuation of the property of the deceased, verified by affidavit or affirmation,
and if such Authority is satisfied that a greater fee was paid on the probate or letters than the law required,
the said Authority may -
(a) cancel the stamp on the probate or letters if such stamp has not been already cancelled;
(b) substitute another stamp for denoting the court-fee which should have been paid thereon; and
(c) make an allowance for the difference between them as in the case of spoiled stamps, or repay the same in moneys, at his discretion. (Section 19-A).
(ii) Relief where debts due from a deceased person have been paid out of his estate .- Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of such Authority that an executor or administrator has paid debts due from the deceased to such an amount as, being deducted out of the amount or value of the estate, reduces the same to a sum which) if it had been the whole gross amount or value of the estate, would have occasioned a less court-fee to be paid on the probate or letters of administration grated in respect of such estate than has been actually paid thereon under this Act, such Authority may return the difference, provided the same be claimed within three years after the date of such probate or letters. But when, by reason of any legal proceeding, the debts due from the deceased have not been ascertained and paid or his effects have been recovered and made available, and in consequence thereof the executor or administrator is prevented from claiming the return of such difference within the said term of three years, the said Authority may allow such further time for making the claim as may appear to be reasonable under the circumstances. (Section 19-B). Thus by this section 19-B, the court-fee payable is not reduced but provision has been made for refund of the proportionate amount of court-fees if any debts are actually discharged from the state. (iii) Relief in case of several grants. - It is provided in section 19-C of the Court-fees Act that whenever a grant of probate or letters of administration has been or is made in respect of the whole of the property belonging to an estate and the full fee chargeable under this Act has been or is paid thereon, no fee shall be chargeable under the same Act when a like grant is made in respect of the whole or any part of the same property belonging to the same estate. Whenever such a grant has been or is made in respect of any property forming part of an estate, the amount of less than actually paid under this Act shall be deducted when a like grant is made in respect of property belonging to the same estate, identical with or including the property to which the former grant relates. There are many cases in which a fresh grant becomes necessary. For instance a probate may be revoked or an executor may die and a portion of an estate may remain unadministered. It is to provide for such case that section 19-C has been enacted. (Bhagwati Saran v. Secy. of State, 54 Ind. Cases 703). Section 19-C provides for cases when fresh grant of a probate of a will or letters of administration of the estate of the same person becomes necessary and the fees have already been paid in respect of the whole or part of the property comprised in the estate of the deceased person. (5 P.L.J. 36). The object of this section is that where the full fee chargeable under the Court- fees Act on a probate at the time it is granted has been paid no further fee is chargeable when a second or subsidiary grant is made in respect of the property comprised in that section. (Sevarnmoy Devi v. Secy. of State, 15 W.R. 489).
Ans. (a) Probates declared valid as to trust property though not covered by court-fee - In a case where the probates of a will or letters administration of the effects of any person deceased have been issued and court-fee already paid therein, though not sufficient, section 19-D of the Court-fees Act provides that they shall be deemed to be valid and available by the administrator notwithstanding that the amount of value of such property is not included in the amount or value of the estate. The holder of the letters of administration or probates is entitled to recover the amount or property and the opposite party cannot resist his claim on the ground that full court- fee has not been paid thereon. The principal reason for the exemption of trust estates from duty is that the beneficiary out of whose pocket the payment would come acquires nothing by the trustee's death. (19 M.L.J. 591).
For purposes of this section trust property is the property held in trust by the testator and not the property as to which the testator had created a trust. (Deputy Commissioner of Singhbum v. Jagdish Chandra, 62 Ind. Cas. 513).
(b) Provisions for cases where too low a court-fee has been paid on probates. - Section 19-E of Court-fees Act lays down that where any person on applying for probates or letters of administration has estimated the estate of the deceased to be of less value than the same has afterwards proved to be and has in consequence paid too low a court-fee thereon, the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (for the local area) in which the probate or letters has or have been granted may, on the value of the estate of the deceased being verified by affidavit or affirmation, cause the probate or letters of administration to be duly stamped on payment of the full court-fee which ought to have been originally paid thereon in respect of such value and of the further penalty, if the probate or letters is or are produced within one year from the date of the grant, of five times, or, if it or they is/or are produced after one year from such date, of twenty times, such proper court- fee, without any deduction, of the court-fee originally paid on such probate or letters :
Provided that, if the application be made within six months after the ascertainment of the true value of the estate and discovery that too low a court-fee was at first paid on the probate or letters, and if the said authority is satisfied that such fee was paid in consequence of a mistake or of its not being known at the time that some particular part of the estate belonged to the deceased, and without any intention of fraud or to delay the payment of the proper court-fee the said Authority may remit the said penalty, and cause the probate or letters to be duly stamped on payment only of the sum wanting to make up the fee which should have been at first paid thereon.
The above section contemplates an application on the part of the person who has taken out probate or letters and products them to be duly stamped. It further contemplates that the estimated value of the estate is less than what the value has afterwards proved to be. Where in a case too low a court-fee has been paid and an application under this section is not made within six months by the executor or administrator the section provides that he shall be subject to a penalty prescribed therefor. [Manekji v. Secy. of State, (1896) B.P.J. 751].
Before the probates or letters of administration are stamped under this section, the administrator is required to execute a proper administration bond under section 291 of the Indian Succession Act. Section 19-F of the Court-fees Act lays down that in case of letters of administration on which too low a court-fee has been paid at first, the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority shall not cause the same to be duly stamped until the administrator has given such security to the court by which the letters of administration have been granted as ought by law to have been given on the granting thereof in case the full value of the estate of the deceased had been ascertained.
In case where too low a court-fee has been paid on any probate or letters of administration in consequence of any mistake, or of its not being known at the time that some particular part of the estate belonged to the deceased if any executor or administrator acting under such probate or letters does not, within six months after the discovery of the mistake or of any effects not known at the time to have belonged to the deceased, apply to the Revenue Authority and pay what is wanting to make up the court-fee which ought to have been paid at first on such probate or letters, he shall forfeit the sum of Rs. 1000 and also a further sum at the rate of 10 per cent. on the amount of the sum wanting to make up the proper court-fee (Section 19-G).
Ans. Section 19-H of Court-fees Act lays down the procedure to check the valuation of property in respect of which an application for probate or letters of administration is made. Section 19-H reads as under :-
(1) Where an application for probate or letters of administration is made to any Court other than a High Court, the Court shall cause notice of the application to be given to the Collector.
(2) Where such an application as aforesaid is made to a High Court, the High Court shall cause notice of the application to be given to the Chief Controlling Revenue-authority [for the local area in which the High Court is situated.]
(3) The Collector within the local limits of whose revenue-jurisdiction the property of the deceased or any part thereof is, may at any time inspect or cause to be inspected, and take or cause to be taken copies of, the record of any case in which application for probate or letters of administration has been made; and if, on such inspection or otherwise, he is of opinion that the petitioner has under-estimated the value of the property of the deceased, the Collector may, if he thinks fit, require the attendance of the petitioner (either in person or by agent) and take evidence and inquire into the matter in such manner as he may think fit, and, if he is still of opinion that the value of the property has been under-estimated, may require the petitioner to amend the valuation.
(4) If the petitioner does not amend the valuation to the satisfaction of the Collector, the Collector may move the Court before which the application for probate or letters of administration was made, to hold an inquiry into the true value of the property :
Provided that no such motion shall be made after the expiration of six months from the date of the exhibition of the inventory required by Section 277 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, or as the case may be, by Section 98 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881.
(5) The Court, when so moved as foresaid, shall hold, or cause to be held, an enquiry accordingly and shall record a finding as to the true value, as near as may be, at which the property of the deceased should have been estimated. The Collector shall be deemed to be a party to the inquiry. (6) For the purposes of any such inquiry, the Court or person authorized by the Court to hold the enquiry may examine the petitioner for probate or letters of administration on oath (whether in person or by commission), and may take such further evidence as may be produced to prove the true value of the property. The person authorized as aforesaid to hold the inquiry shall return to the Court the evidence taken by him and report the result of the inquiry, and such report and the evidence so taken shall be evidence in the proceeding, and the Court may record a finding in accordance with the report, unless it is satisfied that it is erroneous. (7) The finding of the Court recorded under sub-section (5) shall be final, but shall not bar the entertainment and disposal by the Chief Controlling Revenue-authority of any application under Section 19-A. (8) The State Government may make rules for the guidance of Collectors in the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (3). In Pritish Kumar Mitra v. Prosanto Kumar, AIR 1970 Cal. 236, it was observed :- The succession of steps and events in a probate proceeding are:(1) An application for Probate or Letters of Administration is made to the court;
(2) The court shall cause notice of the application to be given to the Collector;
(3) The Collector shall hold an enquiry into the matter and if he is of opinion that the value of the property has been underestimated may require the petitioner to amend the valuation;
(4) If the petitioner does not amend the valuation to the satisfaction of the Collector, the Collector may move the court;
(5) The court, when so moved, shall hold or cause to be held an enquiry and record a finding as to the true value.
That finding of the court shall be final. All these are clearly appearing in the several sub-sections of Section 19-H. Further Section 19-I of Act lays down :-"(1) No order entitling the petitioner to the grant of probate or letter of administration shall be made upon an application for such grant until the petitioner has filed in the court, a valuation of the property in the form set forth in the Third Schedule, and the Court is satisfied that the fee mentioned in No. 11 of the First Schedule has been paid on such valuation.
(2) The grant of probate or letter of administration shall not be delayed by reason of any motion made by Collector under section 19-H sub-section (4)."
Ans. Section 19-J of Court-fees Act provides :-
(1) Any excess fee found to be payable on an inquiry held under Section 19-h, sub-section (6), and any penalty or forfeiture under Section 19-G may, on the certificate of the chief controlling revenue authority, be recovered from the executor or administrator as if it were an arrear of land revenue by any Collector.
(2) The chief controlling revenue authority may remit the whole or any part of any such penalty or forfeiture as aforesaid, or any part of any penalty under Section 19-E or of any court-fee under Section 19-E in excess of the full court-fee which ought to have been paid.
The section is divided into two sub-sections. While sub-section (1) provides for recovery of deficiency in court-fee found in inquiry under Section 19-H, or penalty or forfeiture under Section 19-G, sub-section (2) empowers the chief controlling revenue authority to remit any penalty or forfeiture under Section 19-E or 19-G or and court-fee payable in excess under Section 19-E. Section 19-K of Act provides that nothing in Section 6 or Section 28 shall apply to probates or letter of administration.
Ans. Section 20 of Court-fees Act empowers the High Court to make rules on the following matters :-
(i) The fees chargeable for serving and executing processes issued by such court in its appellate jurisdiction, and by the other Civil and Revenue Court established within the local limit of such jurisdiction;
(ii) the fees chargeable for serving and executing processes issued by the Criminal Courts established within such limits in the case of offences other than offences for which public officers may arrest without a warrant; and
(iii) the remuneration of the peons and all other persons employed by leave of a court in the service or execution of processes.
The High Court may from time to time alter and add to the rules so made. All such rules and alterations and additions shall, after being confirmed by the State Government, be published in the official Gazette and shall thereupon have the force of law. Until such rules shall be so made and published, the fees now leviable for serving and executing processes shall continue to be levied and shall be deemed to be fees leviable under this Act. A table in the English and Vernacular languages showing the fees chargeable for such service and execution shall be exposed to view in a conspicuous part of each Court. (Section 21). Subject to rules to be made by the High Court and approved by the State Government, every District Judge and every Magistrate of a district shall fix, and may, from time to time, alter the number of peons necessary to be employed for the service and execution of processes issued out of his court and each of the Courts subordinate thereto. And for the purposes of this section every Court of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court of the District Judge. (Section 22). Subject to rules to be framed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and approved by the State Government, every officer performing the functions of a Collector of a District shall fix and may, from time to time, alter the number of peons necessary to be employed for the service and execution of processes issued out of his Court or the Courts subordinate to him. (Section 23).
Ans. Section 25 of Court-fees Act provides that all fees referred to in Section 3 or chargeable under this Act shall be collected by stamps.
Then Section 26 of Act says that "The stamps used to denote any fee chargeable under this Act shall be impressed or adhesive or partly impressed and partly adhesive as the Appropriate Government may by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time direct.
Section 27 of Court-fees Act further says - "The Appropriate Government may from time to time makes rules regulating :-
(a) the supply of stamps to be used under this Act.
(b) the number of stamps to be used for denoting any fee chargeable under this Act.
(c) the renewal of damaged or spoiled stamp.
(d) the keeping of all accounts of all stamps used under this Act:
Provided that in the case of stamps used under Section 3 in a High Court such rules shall be made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of such Court.
All such rules shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall thereupon have the force of law.
Ans. Section 28 of Court-fees Act provides :- No document which ought to bear a stamp under this Act shall be of any validity, unless and until it is properly stamped.
But, if any such document is through mistake or inadvertance received, filed or used in any Court or office without being properly stamped, the presiding Judge or the head of the office, as the case may be, or, in the case of a High Court, any Judge of such Court, may, if he thinks fit, order that such document be stamped as he may direct; and, on such document being stamped accordingly, the same and every proceeding relative thereto shall be as valid as if it had been properly stamped in the first instance.
The first part of this section provides that no document which is required to be stamped shall be used, unless it is properly stamped, and in a way supplements Sections 4 and 6 of this Act. The second paragraph of the section is intended to empower the Court, or the Judge when such an improperly stamped document has through mistake or inadvertence, been received, filed or used in the Court, make an order that such document may be properly stamped in the first instance. The section is not in conflict with Sections 9, 10 and 11 of this Act or with Section 54 (now Order 7, rule 11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision of Order 7 rule 11 of the C.P.C. read with this section clearly imply that opportunity has to be given to the party concerned to pay the proper stamp, and it is only on his failure to do so that the Court is entitled to decline to look at the document. But if after the mistake in the amount of court-fee paid is pointed out to him, he does not avail of the indulgence and fails to rectify the mistake, he is not entitled to any extension of time.
The section corresponds, more or less, to Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fee has not been paid, the court may, in its discretion at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force, and effect as it such fee had been paid in the first instance. The powers conferred on courts under this section are wider than those in Section 28, as the words `at any stage' will indicate. Moreover, it is to be remembered that Section 149, Civil Procedure Code applies to civil courts only and not to criminal courts.
This section applies only where an insufficiently stamped document has been received through mistake or inadvertence. But where there is no question of such mistake or inadvertence, it has no application. So where, owing to the existence of plague, the plaintiff was unable either to procure a court-fee stamp or to present the plaint in person, as he was restrained from going beyond certain limits under executive orders, and he sent the plaint unstamped and put in the requisite court-fee stamps on the removal of restrictions, but after the expiry of the period of limitation, it was held that Section 28 was not applicable to the circumstances of the case. Again, Section 28 does not apply to probate duty the reason being that it would be highly impracticable to make the validity of testamentary grants depend on the question as to the sufficiency of the stamp. (AIR 1925 Cal. 1201).
Ans. Section 30 of Court-fees Act provides :-
No document requiring a stamp under this Act shall be filed or acted upon in any proceeding in any court or office until the stamp has been cancelled.
Such officer as the court or the head of the office may, from time to time, appoint shall, on receiving any such document, forthwith effect such cancellation by punching out the figurehead so as to leave the amount designated on the stamp untouched, and the part removed by punching shall be burnt or otherwise destroyed.
Scope : This section provides for cancellation of stamp filed in any proceeding in any court of office, and also the procedure to be followed in such cancellation. The court or head of office has been empowered to appoint from time to time such officer who will effect such cancellation. The part removed by punching must be burnt or otherwise destroyed.
Cancellation : The cancellation of a stamp must be made by punching out the figurehead of the stamp but not the amount designated on the stamp. The endorsements on the stamps of the date of issue and the purchaser's name are not a cancellation of the stamp either in fact or in practice.
Ans. Section 33 of Court-fees Act says : "Whenever the filing or exhibition in a criminal court, of a document in respect of which the proper fee has not been paid is in the opinion of presiding judge, necessary to prevent a failure of justice, nothing contained in section 4 or section 6 shall be deemed to prohibit such filling or exhibition.
Ans. Section 34 of Court-fees Act says : (1) The appropriate government may, from time to time, make rules for regulating the sale of stamps to be used under this Act, the provisions by whom alone such sale is to be conducted, and the duties and remuneration of such persons.
(2) All such rules shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall thereupon have the force of law.
(3) Any person appointed to sell stamps who disobeys any rule made under this section and any person not so appointed who sells or offers for sale any stamp, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
Sub-section (1) of this section empowers the appropriate government to make rules for regulating the sale of stamps which are to be used under this Act, while sub-section (2) provides for the publication of all such rules in the Official Gazette to have the force of law. Sub-section (3) of the section is a penal provision, whereby it is provided that disobedience of the rules made under this Act by any person appointed to sell the stamps and the sale of, or offer to sell, stamps by any person not appointed for the purpose will be an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine or both.
Ans. Power to reduce or remit fees. - Section 35 of the Court-fees Act provides that the appropriate Government may from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, reduce or remit, in the whole or in part of territories under its administration, all or any of the fees mentioned in the First and Second Schedules to this Act annexed, and may in like manner cancel or vary such order.
The above section thus confers the powers to reduce or remit fee upon the appropriate Government which make rules in this respect for the territories of this administration.
Ans. Scope and Object of Act : The Suits Valuation Act was passed in order to prescribe the mode of valuation for certain suits for the purpose of jurisdiction. The object of the Suits Valuation Act is to prescribe the method of valuing certain suits for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of Courts with regard thereto. The Act contemplates suits in which court-fee value may be different from the value for the purpose of jurisdiction.
In Madhusudan v. Mani Lal, AIR 1963 Guj. 291 it was observed that where a suit relates to two or more causes of action or two or more relief based on same cause of action the aggregate value of relief claimed will determine the valuation of suit for purpose of jurisdiction of the suit as well as appeal.
Part I of the Suits Valuation Act empowers the State Government to make rules for determination of the value of the land for purposes of jurisdiction in certain classes of suits, and Part II declares that in suits coming within paras V, VI, IX and X(d) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. Part III covers supplemental provisions prescribing procedure where objection is taken on appeal or revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes. The Act does not deal with the question of the limits of the pecuniary jurisdiction of different classes of courts.
Ans. Court's Power to Investigate Valuation : It is well-settled that the proper valuation of a suit for purposes of jurisdiction is a preliminary question which should be decided before the case is tried. The final decision on valuation, where there is a dispute between the parties, rests with the court trying it, and, where the valuation can be correctly ascertained, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to put an arbitrary value upon the claim, nor can he be allowed to overvalue or undervalue his claim with a view to choose his forum. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not interfere with a valuation made by a trial court for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, but it is always open to a party to take this as a ground of appeal. The court may also investigate the matter in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Thus an appeal on the ground of defect of jurisdiction may, if successful, disturb the finality of the valuation for purposes of computation of court-fee in suits coming under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. It is the duty of a court of appeal, when an appeal is presented to it, to determine the jurisdictional value of the appeal and, if it comes to the conclusion that the value exceeds its jurisdiction, to return the appeal for presentation to the proper court.
Ans. Valuation for Purposes of Court-fees and Jurisdiction - In Daya Chand v. Hem Chand, 4 Bom. 515 (F.B.), it was observed :- A suit has to be valued for purposes of jurisdiction not according to the special rules of the Court- fees Act but according to the market value of the subject-matter of a suit. Valuation of suits for purposes of jurisdiction is perfectly distinct from valuation for the fiscal purposes of determining the court-fees, the one depending on the value of the subject-matter and the other on a certain value fixed by statutory rules. The rules laid down under the Court-fees Act cannot be taken necessarily as a guide for determination of jurisdictional value of a suit or appeal. The two Acts are not in pari Materia, and for that reason it is not permissible to treat them as forming a code and read together, the one being an Act fixing the value for purposes of jurisdiction and the other being a fiscal enactment prescribing rules to determine the value of a suit for purposes of court-fees.
It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245, that the effect of provisions of Section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value determinable for computation of court-fees. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. In such a case it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice-versa.
In Gopalkrishan Pillai v. Minakshi Ayal, AIR 1967 SC 155 it was observed that once the subject-matter of suit has been properly valued for the purpose of court-fee then such valuation continues to be proper. Valuation for the purpose of subsequent appeals also. Such valuation cannot fluctuate on account of relief of future mesne profits being allowed or disallowed.
Ans. Rules as to determination of value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in suits relating to land. Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act deals with the power of the State Government to make rules determining value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in suits relating to land. It provides as follows :-
(1) The State Government may make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in suits mentioned in Section 7(v), (vi) and (x)(d) of the Court-fees Act.
(2) The rules may determine the value of any class of land, or of any interest in land in the whole or any part of a local area and may prescribe different values for different places within the same local area.
The above section empowers the State Government to make rules for the valuation of land for the purposes of jurisdiction in the following cases :-(i) Suits for possession of land (Section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act) :
(ii) Suits for pre-emption with reference to land. [Section 7(vi) of the Court-fees Act]; and
(iii) Suits for the specific performance of an award relating to land or an interest therein. [Section 7 (x)(d) of the Court-fees Act].
Under this section local (State) government has been empowered to make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in suits falling under Section 7(v), (vi) and (x)(d) of the Court-fees Act. Where the value of the subject-matter has been determined by rules under Section 9, its value for purposes of jurisdiction can never exceed the value of land as determined by rules framed under this section does not exist in all the States. It exists only in those states where the provision of Part I of this Act have been extended by notification. Ram Sekhar Prasad v. Sheo Nandan, AIR 1923 Pat. 137. Section 4 of the Act is supplementary to section 3 above. It applies to certain classes of suits which are not covered by Section 3. It provides that where a suit mentioned in section 7(iv) or Article 17 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act relates to land or an interest therein of which the value has been determined by the rules under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, the amount at which for purposes of jurisdiction the relief sought in the suit is valued shall not exceed the value of the land or interest as determined by those rules. This section indicates that the principle adopted by the legislature for valuing a suit mentioned in section 7(iv) or Schedule II, Article 17 of the Court-fees Act, which relates to land or interest in land is that the value of such a suit for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be governed by the value of the land or interest therein. When such values are not determined by rules framed under the present section, they must be determined by judicial decisions. (Dayaram v. Goverdhan Das, 31 Bom. 71). It is important to note that the above Section fixes the maximum value of the jurisdiction in the suits to which it relates and does not deal with any minimum, which apparently has been left for judicial decisions. (Sohan Singh v. Devi Singh, 46 Ind. Cases 90).
Ans. Suit for declaration with consequential relief. - The weight of authority is for the proposition that a plaintiff has an absolute and unfettered discretion to give his own valuation as he pleases in a suit falling under section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act, and the Court has no power to interfere with such discretion. It follows that in suits for declaration with consequential relief the plaintiff can give any valuation as he pleases. But when the suit relates to land or to an interest therein of which the value has been determined by rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, the amount at which the relief sought in the suit is valued cannot exceed the value of the land or interest so determined. (Barru v. Lachhman, III PR. 1913 FB).
In AIR 1958 SC 245, it was observed that computation of Court-fees in cases falling under Section 17(iv) of Court-fees Act depends upon the valuation that plaintiff makes in respect of his claim; once the plaintiff exercise his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction.
In the above context the Allahabad High Court has taken a different view. It has held that section 4 the Suits Valuation Act, no doubt, prescribes only a maximum valuation which can be put on the relief for purposes of jurisdiction in certain classes of suits, e.g., a suit for a declaration of title to land, but that does not mean that the plaintiff is at liberty to put any valuation he likes subject to that maximum on that relief, the market value should determine the jurisdiction in a suit for determination of title. (Jagdish Saran v. Jai Dei, 56 All. 198). Where the court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff's valuation is deliberately fictitious, it can compel the plaintiff to make a fresh valuation but it cannot make a valuation itself in place of the plaintiff's valuation (Ashaq Ali v. Imtiaz Begum, 15 A.L.J. 794).
The Patna and Calcutta High Courts agree with the Allahabad High Court's view. They have also held that the plaintiff cannot in such case put an arbitrary value unquestionable by the courts. According to them section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act simply means that the valuation in the first instance is to be made by the party concerned but is finally to be made by the Court. (Ram Shekhar Prasad v. Sheonandan, 2 P. 198; Brij Krishna v. Bipin Bithari, 40 Cal. 245).