U.P. State Electricity Board v. Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., (SC) BS88632
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- S. Saghir Ahmad, Y.K. Sabharwal and S.N. Variava, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 3655 of 1993. D/d. 12.5.2000.

U.P. State Electricity Board - Appellant

Versus

Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. - Respondent

For the Appellant :- B. Sen, Sr. Advocate with Pradeep Misra and T. Mahipal, Advocates.

For the Respondent :- Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Advocate with Mrs. Meera Mathur, Advocate for M/s. J.B.D. and Co., Advocates.

Electricity Act, 1910, Sections 6 and 7A (U.P. Amendment and validation Act, 1976) - Take over of electric company - Challenged - Grounds - Payment of compensation - Constitutional provisions stand violated - Held - Only method or principle on the basis of which compensation was to be worked out, has been changed - There is nexus to the objects under Article 39(b) and is protected under Article 31(c) - Appeal allowed.

[Paras 13 and 14]

Cases Referred :-

Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989)3 SCC 709.

Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Thane Electric Supply Co., (1989)3 SCC 616.

Vellore Electric Corporation Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1989)4 SCC 138.

Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978)2 SCC 50 : 1978 Lab IC 612.

State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga, 1952 SCR 889.

JUDGMENT

S.N. Variava, J. - This Civil Appeal is against the judgment dated 17th September, 1987 delivered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. By this judgment the Division Bench dismissed the Appeal filed by the Appellant against a judgment of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court which upheld the challenge of the 1st Respondent to Ordinances and Amendment Act set out hereinafter.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows :

3. On February 4, 1975, Indian Electricity (U.P. Amendment and Validation) Ordinance No. 7 of 1975 was passed. This ordinance amended certain provisions of the Indian Electricity Act. Subsequently this Ordinance was replaced by an Act namely Indian Electricity (U.P. Amendment and Validation) Act, 1976. The Ordinance and the Act amended amongst others Sections 6 and 7A of the Indian Electricity Act.

4. At this stage it is necessary to see what the unamended Sections 6 and 7-A provided for. They read as follows :

5. Thus, under Section 6 the compensation, i.e. the purchase price was to be determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 7-A.

6. Section 7-A, as it originally stood, reads as follows :

7. Section 7 is also relevant, it reads as follows :

8. By the abovementioned Ordinance and the Act, the amendment which was carried out was that under Section 7-A instead of purchase price being the market value, it was now provided that the amount payable for the undertaking would be the book value of the undertaking. Thus, instead of computing the market value, there had to be computation on the book value.

9. It must be mentioned that the above-mentioned Ordinances and Amendment Act were part of the policy of nationalisation of electric companies by the Union of India, Similar amendments were made by many States. Electric companies, all over India, were sought to be so purchased. Like the 1st Respondent, a number of other Electric Companies challenged the constitutional validity of the amending Act/Ordinance. The challenge was, inter alia, on the ground that the rights under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(2) were being violated. It was also claimed that the Amending Act/Ordinance was invalid as it had no reasonable direct nexus to the principles under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. It was also claimed that, in effect and substance, the law was not one for acquisition of electrical undertakings but was one to acquire a chose-in-action and to extinguish rights, which had accrued in the Electric Companies, to get the market price. It was contended that the right to get compensation accrued on the day the notice was given. It was contended that what was being acquired was the difference between the market price which the State was obliged to pay and the book value to which the liability was now sought to be limited. It was claimed that as the Act was merely a clock which the law was made to wear, to undo the obligations arising out of intended statutory sale, Article 31(c) was not attracted. It was also claimed that in any case, every provision of a statute was not entitled to protection of Article 31(c) but only those which are necessary for giving effect to the principles in Article 39(b) and accordingly the provision in the impugned law in relation to the determination of the amount do not attract Article 31(c), In all the matters it was claimed that the purchase price should be the market value.

10. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989)3 SCC 709 , upheld the validity of the Act/Ordinance. This Court held that the Act had nexus with the principles in Article 39(b) and was therefore protected by Article 31(c). It was held that the Act was not a piece of colourable legislation. It was held that electric energy generated and distributed was a "material resource of the community" for the purpose and within the meaning of Article 39(b). It was held that the idea of distribution of natural resources in Article 39(b) envisages nationalisation. It was held that on an examination of the scheme of the impugned law the inescapable conclusion was that the legislature measure was one of nationalisation of the undertaking and this law was eligible for and entitled to protection of Article 39(c). It was held that it was not possible to divorce the economic consideration or component from the scheme of nationalisation with which the former are inextricably integrated. It was held that the financial costs of a scheme lies at its very heart and cannot be isolated. It was held that with the provisions relating to vestiture of the undertaking in the State and those pertaining to the quantification of the amount are integral and inseparable parts of the integral scheme of nationalisation and do not admit of being considered as distinct provisions independent of each other. It was held that the provisions for payment of amount to the undertaking, by reducing the market value to book value, formed an integral part of the nationalisation scheme and that economic consideration for nationalisation was not justiciable. It was held that what was being acquired was the material resources of the community. The contention that immediately upon giving of the notice the rights got crystallised and negatived. It was held that the exercise of the option did not affect licensee's right to carry on business. It was held that the licensee's rights would be affected only when the undertaking was actually taken over. Similar view was taken in the cases of Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Thane Electric Supply Co., (1989)3 SCC 616 , and Vellore Electric Corporation Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1989)4 SCC 138 .

11. This case is entirely covered by the abovementioned judgments. Dr. Singhvi, however, submitted that the notice to take over the undertaking was given on December 4, 1972 and the undertaking was taken over on December 18, 1973. He submitted that on the date of takeover the rights of the 1st Respondent had crystallised. He submitted that the 1st Respondent, therefore became entitled to receive the market value of the property. He submitted that as the amount payable had already got crystallised, a subsequent acquisition could only be acquisition of money. He submitted that on December 18, 1973 the vesting took place. He submitted that thereafter nothing more than payment of money was to be done. He submitted that by a retrospective amendment, made in 1975, money could not be compulsory acquired. He submitted that there could be no public purpose in acquisition of money and that such acquisition would amount to a forced loan. He submitted that one restrictions laid down by the retrospective amendment were not reasonable. He submitted that no reasons for such restrictions were given or could exist. He submitted that by the amendment the crystallised right to money was being taken away.

12. In support of his submission Dr. Singhvi relied upon the case of Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978)2 SCC 50 : 1978 Lab IC 612. In that case there was a settlement between the management and the labour under which an annual cash bonus was to be paid to Class III and Class IV employees. By the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 Class III and Class IV employees were sought to be deprived of the annual cash bonus that they were entitled to receive under the settlement. This Court held that the term 'Property' under Articles 19(1)(f), 31(1) and 31(2) had to be given the widest interpretation and refers to property of every kind, tangible or intangible, debts and chose-in-action. It was held that the chose-in-action could be compulsory acquired under Article 31(2). It was held that the right to receive the annual cash settlement was a right to property within the meaning of Article 31(2). It was held that extinguishments of the debt of a creditor with the corresponding benefit to the State or State owned/controlled Corporation would be transfer of ownership to the State and would amount to compulsory acquisition under Article 31(2). It was held that acquisition of money, debt and/or chose-in-action must be made to serve a public purpose. It was held that the impugned Act was a pure and simple case of deprivation of the rights of the Class II and Class IV employees without any apparent nexus with any public interest. It was held that an acquisition of a chose-in-action could not be for the purpose of augmenting the revenue of the State of reducing State expenditure as that would not be a public purpose and would be violative of the constitutional guarantee embodied in Article 31(2). It was held that an acquisition of this nature amounted to a forced loan. Mr. Singhvi also relied upon the case of State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga, 1952 SCR 889.

13. We are unable to accept the submission. As has been held in Tinsukhia's case, Thana Electric Supply Company's case and Vellore Electric Corporation's case what has been acquired is not a chose-in-action or a debt. What (has) been acquired is the undertaking which dealt with material resource of the country. There was no crystallisation of any amount. The only right was a right to receive compensation which was to be worked out on certain principles. All that the amending Act has done is to change the method or principle on the basis of which the compensation was to be worked out. As set out above it has been held that the legislation has nexus to the objects under Article 39(b) and is protected under Article 31(c). It has been held that the legislation is not a piece of colourable legislation. It has also been held, in the abovementioned cases, that the provisions for quantification of the amount payable to the undertaking form an integral and inseparable part of the nationalisation and do not admit of being considered as distinct provisions independent of each other. It has been held that the economic costs of nationalisation was not justiciable. In our view this case is fully covered by the judgments in Tinsukhia's case, Thana Electric Supply Company's case and Vellore Electric Corporation's case.

14. In this view of the matter, the Appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench dated September 17, 1987 as well as the judgment of the learned single Judge dated April 4, 1984 are set aside. The writ petition filed by the 1st Respondent stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.