Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (SC) BS87275
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Large Bench)

Before:- Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J.I., S.B. Majmudar, Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, K. Venkataswami and V.N. Khare, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 398 of 1977 [with C.A. Nos. 399 of 1977, 3505, 3506 of 1992, 1880 of 1988, W.P. (C) No. 1250 of 1986, C.A.Nos. 4500-05 of 1992, 234 of 1995, 8163, 7432 of 1994, C.A.Nos. 4374-75 of 1999 @ SLP (C) Nos. 3159-60 of 1994, C.A.Nos. 2632-33 of 1982, C.A.No. 2532 of 1980, C.A.Nos. 2951, 2952 and 2953 of 1992, C.A.No. 829 of 1993, C.A.No. 4376 of 1999 @ SLP (C) No. 9684 of 1992, C.A.Nos. 1282 of 1995, 1427 of 1979]. D/d. 10.8.1999.

Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. - Appellant

Versus

The State of Bihar and others etc. - Respondents

For the Appearing Parties :- R.N. Trivedi, Addl. Solicitor General, Shanti Bhushan, Y. V. Giri, Dipankar Gupta, G. L. Sanghi (A. K. Goel), Addl. Advocate General, Subodh Markandeya, Rakesh Dwivedi, H. N. Salve, H. L. Agrawal, Ram Janam Ojha, Sr. Advocates, Shri Narain, Ramesh K. Agrawal, H. Deorajan, Sandeep Narain, Dhruv Agarwal, Praveen Kumar, Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Binu Tamta, Chandra Bhushan, Ms. Parul Gupta, Gopal Jain, R. N. Karanjawala, Ms. Nandini Gore, Sandeep Mittal, Ms. Manik Karanjawala, Ms. Meera Mathur, A. K. Srivastava, R. B. Misra, K. Misra, Sunil Jain, Gauri Rasgotra, S. S. Khanduja, C. N. Sree Kumar, A. Subba Rao, Saket Singh, B. B. Singh, D. Goburdhan, D. N. Goburdhan, Ravinder Narain, Ms. A. K. Verma, Sanjiv Sen, Irshad Ahmad, Sudhir Kumar Gupta, M. P. Jha, Anis Ahmad Khan, S. Ganesh, Ram Ekbal Roy, Ms. Pinki Anand, Advocates.

A. Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 27 - Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1975, Rule 82(iii) - Levy of market fee on transactions of sale of sugar and molasses - Locus standi of sugar factories to challenge levy - Sugar factories after purchasing sugarcane, manufacturing sugar and molasses and selling it to unlicensed buyers - Sugar factories as sellers realise market fee from buyers and deposit it with market committee - Sugar factories, have locus standi to challenge imposition of market fee.

[Para 12]

B. Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 42, Section 15 - Constitution of India, Article 254 -Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1982, Section 1 - Two legislations i.e. Markets Act and Sugarcane Act operating in same field - Whether the two can be reconciled or not - Fact that provisions of inconsistent enactment i.e. Market Act can be excluded by resorting to exemption power - Does not cure basic inconsistency between two legislations - Special Act i.e. Sugarcane Act held, excludes operation of General Act i.e. Market Act.

[Para 64]

C. Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Section 3 - Sugarcane (Control) Order (1966), Clause 3 - Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 15 - Sale of sugar manufactured out of sugarcane is regulated by special provisions of various orders issued under Essential Commodities Act - General provisions of Section 15 of Market Act are inapplicable.

[Paras 69 and 80]

D. Bihar Molasses (Control) Act, 1947, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 - Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 15 - Agricultural Produce - Sale and purchase of molasses by sugar factories - Molasses being a by product resulting from manufacture of sugar is wholly controlled by special provisions of Molasses Control Act - General provisions of Market Act not applicable.

[Paras 95 and 96]

E. Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, Section 18G, Schedule 1 - Constitution of India, Article 254 - Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 27 - Agricultural Produce - Wheat and products of flour industry - Production of wheat as raw material, wheat not covered by IDR Act - Transaction of purchase and sale of products of wheat industry can be regulated by State Act i.e. Bihar Market Act - Mere existence of statutory provision in IDR Act i.e. Central Act to issue orders does not exclude State Legislature from regulating sale and purchase of products of flour industry - IDR Act deals with industries in general.

[Paras 110, 111 and 113]

F. Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 2(1)(a) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Section 3 - Essential Commodities - Agricultural Produce - Oil manufactured by crushing oil seeds is agricultural produce - Transaction of sale and purchase of vegetable oil products in market areas is regulated by Market Act and not various orders framed under Section 3 of Essential Commodities Act - because none of these orders deals with the topic of regulation of prices and sale and purchase of vegetable oil products.

[Paras 116 and 117]

G. Tea Act, 1953, Section 30 - Constitution of India, Schedule 7, List III, Entries 32, 33 and 53 - Constitution of India, Article 254 - Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Section 39 - Agricultural Produce - Purchase and sale of tea - No Control Order issued by Central Government under Section 30 of Tea Act regarding control price and distribution of tea and tea waste - State Legislature competent to cover the field by exercising its legislative powers under Entry 33 of Concurrent List.

[Paras 159 and 162]

H. Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, Sections 30 and 15 - Agricultural Produce - Sale of manufactured and packed tea in market area - Levy of market fee - Is supported by adequate quid pro quo in view of benefit of infrastructural facilities made available by market committee - Not possible to contend that there is no quid pro quo underlying transactions of sale of packed tea by the appellant's stockist in the market yards maintained by the market committee concerned.

[Para 184]

Cases Referred :-

Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd., Riga v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1977 Patna 136.

M.C.V.S. Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 92.

Vasavi Traders v. State of Karnataka, (1982) 2 Kant LJ 357.

I.T.C. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1985 (Suppl) SCC 476.

Jugal Kishore v. State of Maharashtra, 1989 Suppl (1) SCC 589.

S. Satyapal Reddy v. Government of A.P., (1994) 4 SCC 391.

SIEL Ltd. v. Union of India, (1998) 7 SCC 26 1998 All LJ 2239).

Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416.

Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Orissa (1961) 2 SCR 537, at page 558.

Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Company v. State of U.P., 1980 (Supp) SCC 27.

Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 2 SCC 722.

Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1985) 2 SCC 485.

Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1956 SCR 393.

Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh, 1939 FCR 193, 212.

Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Dominion (1896 ACT 348).

JUDGMENT

S.B. Majmudar, J. - Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.

2. These appeals and writ petitions mainly raise the question regarding the legality of the levy of market fee under the provisions of Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Market Act' for short). The grievance made by the appellants/writ petitioners pertained to the following commodities with which the respective proceedings are concerned.

It will, therefore, be appropriate to deal seriatim the grievances centering round the levy of market fee on transactions concerning the aforesaid commodities.

GRIEVANCES IN CONNECTION WITH MARKET FEE CONCERNING SUGAR MATTERS

3. So far as this group of matters is concerned, first two Civil Appeal Nos. 398 and 399 of 1977 arise out of certificates of fitness granted by the High Court of Judicature at Patna under Articles 132(1) and 133(1) of the Constitution of India. The said certificates pertain to a common judgment of the High Court rendered in two writ petitions of two sugar mills located in the State of Bihar. By the common judgment dated 20th April, 1976 the High Court dismissed both the writ petitions. The said judgment of the High Court is reported in The Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd., Riga v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1977 Patna 136. By the impugned common judgment, the imposition of market fee under the Market Act on the transactions of purchase of sugarcane by the sugar mills concerned and also on their transactions covering sale of sugar and molasses manufactured by utilising the purchased sugarcane was upheld by the High Court.

4. In view of the fact that the certificates of fitness were granted by the High Court as aforesaid this group of matters was directed to be placed before a Constitution Bench of this Court as per Article 145 of the Constitution of India. Though initially they were directed to be placed before a Bench of seven Judges, subsequently by a latter order dated 9th December, 1998, these appeals were directed to be placed before a five-Judge Bench and that is how these appeals and other cognate matters were placed before this Bench for final hearing.

5. Though the certificates of fitness granted by the High Court were on the basis that the cases involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India, at the time when these appeals and the cognate matters reached final hearing before us, learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan and Shri Gupta appearing for the appellants, raised mainly two contentions for our consideration :

RIVAL CONTENTIONS :

6. Learned senior counsel for the appellants vehemently submitted in support of the aforesaid twin contentions that the Market Act which was enacted by the Bihar Legislature under Entries 26 and 27 of the State List read with Entry 28 therein had to be read subject to Entry 33 of the Concurrent List and as the Bihar Legislature itself had enacted the Sugar Act in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List, there was no occasion left for the State of Bihar to get satisfied about the need to regulate the production and sale of sugarcane as well as manufactured items therefrom as per the Market Act. In short, the invocation of Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Market Act was totally misconceived and uncalled for. It was further contended that once the State of Bihar in exercise of its power of exemption under Section 42 of the Market Act had exempted the appellant-sugar factories from applicability of Section 18 of the Market Act, the entire machinery under the Market Act became inapplicable to regulate the sale and purchase of transactions concerning sugarcane, sugar and molasses as entered into by the appellant-sugar factories. Consequently, there remained no occasion for the authorities functioning under the Market Act for demanding any market fee from the appellants under Section 27 of the Market Act. It was also contended in further support of this submission that the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 as well as the Sugar (Control) Order of the same year issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and also the provisions of the Bihar Molasses (Control) Act, 1947 fully occupied the field of regulation of sale and purchase of sugarcane, sugar and molasses and on that ground also the provisions of the Market Act could not be pressed in service against the appellant-sugar factories undertaking the purchase and sale of the concerned transactions. In the alternative, it was contended that once Section 15 of the Market Act is out of picture and once it remains an admitted position that the appellant-sugar factories have to purchase sugarcane from purchase centres, there remains no occasion for the market committees to give any services under the Market Act to the appellant-sugar factories. Hence the market committees were not entitled to recover any market fee from the appellants as there was no return benefit or quid pro quo made available to the appellants by the market committees and hence the impugned market fee in substance became a tax which could not be recovered under the Market Act by the market committees.

7. Replying to these contentions, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Bihar and learned senior counsel appearing for the market committees submitted that the appellant-sugar factories have no locus standi to maintain these proceedings for the simple reason that so far as their challenges to the levy of market fee on transactions of sale of sugar and molasses were concerned, as under Section 27 of the Market Act levy was imposed on the buyers of sugar and molasses manufactured by the appellant-companies, these sugar mills were not affected by the levy. That the appellant-companies may at the highest be collecting agents of market fee if the buyers were not licensed under the Act but in most of the cases the appellant-sugar companies were selling levy sugar to the Food Corporation of India and even free sugar was mostly sold by them to licensed buyers. Same was the case of sale of molasses to the concerned buyers. They, however, rightly conceded that the appellants cannot be said to be not having any locus standi to challenge the market fee levied on their purchase of sugarcane as the charge of market fee would be on them as buyers of sugarcane.

8. On the merits of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that even if the exemption notification under Section 42 of the Act purports to exempt the appellant-sugar companies from whole of Section 15 of the Market Act, in substance the exemption is confined to Section 15(2) of the Act as there is already a declaration under Section 4 of the Market Act treating the purchase centres of the appellant-sugar companies at the factory gates as well as at other places in the market area as sub-market yards. On a conjoint reading of these two notifications, therefore, it can be seen that exemption under Section 42 of the Act was confined to excluding the operation of Section 15(2) of the Act qua these sugar factories. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the exemption notification is treated to cover entire Section 15 even then once the transactions of sale and purchase take place within the market area, charge under Section 27 would get settled on these transactions. It was further submitted that there is enough return benefit made available to the sugar factories admittedly situated within the market area. That, in fact, their service centres are also declared to be sub-market yards even beyond the factory gate. That they utilise the link roads made available by the market committee for bringing sugarcane produce to the factory premises by giving facility of swift transportation. Thus the sugarcane as a raw material is brought to the factory premises before it gets dried up. This yields better quality and larger quantity of sugar and molasses. In addition thereto facilities of supply of necessary information regarding the prevalent prices of sugarcane are made available by the market committee. But even apart from that, the market committee can act as a mediator in enabling the sugarcane growers to get better price of sugarcane above the minimum price fixed under the Control Order and the Sugarcane Act and this role of the market committee would be beneficial not only to the producers of sugarcane but also to the factories which can be assured of appropriate good quality sugarcane purchased from the sugarcane growers. It is, therefore, wrong to suggest that there is no quid pro quo between the charge of market fee and the payment thereof by the sugarcane factories, that the infrastructural facilities made available to the industry as a whole have to be seen and transactions are not to be dissected for finding out the quid pro quo between charging of the market fee and the burden thereof borne by the sugar companies. It was, therefore, contended that none of the submissions canvassed by learned senior counsel for the appellants deserved to be accepted.

9. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions, we now proceed to deal with the twin contentions submitted for our consideration by learned senior counsel for the appellants in support of these appeals. However, before we deal with the merits of these contentions, the question of locus standi of the appellants is required to be considerd at the outset.

LOCUS STANDI OF THE APPELLANTS TO MAINTAIN THESE PROCEEDINGS :

10. It has to be kept in view that as per Section 27 of the Market Act the charge of the market fee is on the buyer of the agricultural produce bought or sold in the market area. The said section reads as under :

11. It is not in dispute between the parties that sugarcane is an 'agricultural produce' as it is grown in fields by the cultivators. Both sugarcane and sugar are listed as Item Nos. 1 and 3 in Para XII dealing with miscellaneous items as found in the Schedule to the Market Act enacted as per Section 2(1)(a) of the Act.

Section 2(1)(a) of the Act defines 'agricultural produce' as under :

12. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, it is obvious that the sugar factories operating in the market area within the jurisdiction of the market committee concerned can be said to be buyers of sugarcane, an 'agricultural produce'. Their purchase centres are situated within the market area. As submitted by learned senior counsel for the respondents, all the purchase centres at which the appellant-sugar factories purchase sugarcane as raw material are not only situated within the market area but are also declared as sub-market yards. In fact the entire Bihar State is comprised of various market areas within the jurisdiction of different market committees. If that is so, it has to be held that when the charge under Section 27 of paying market fee is imposed on the sugar factories as buyers of sugarcane within the market area, they have to be treated to be having sufficient locus standias buyers of sugarcane to challenge the imposition of market fee on their purchase transactions. On this aspect, learned senior counsel for the respondents did not contest. However, their submission was that when purchased sugarcane is processed at the factories and converted into sugar and molasses and when such sugar and molasses are sold by the sugar factories, the charge of market fee on these sale transactions would settle on the buyers of sugar and molasses who have not made any grievance about payment of market fee. That may be so, however, the fact remains that if the sugar factories sell manufactured sugar and molasses out of the purchased raw material-sugarcane, and if the buyers are not licensed then as per the provisions of Rule 82(iii) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1975 the sugar factories as sellers have to realise the market fee from the buyers and have to deposit the same with the market committees. That obligation by itself would give sufficient locus standito the sugar factories which sell sugar and molasses within the market area to challenge the aforesaid statutory obligation imposed on them by the Act and the Rules and to submit as to how they are not covered by the provisions of the Act. It may be that when they sell levy sugar to the Food Corporation of India, they may not have to undertake this liability as collecting agents of the market committee, so far as the market fee is concerned. Still even if partially in case of sale of free sugar to unlicensed buyers they have to be called upon to discharge their statutory obligation under Rule 82(iii), it cannot be said that they have no locus standito challenged the imposition of market fee on the transactions of sale effected by them in connection with sugar and molasses. The preliminary objection of learned senior counsel for the respondents against the locus standi of the appellants to maintain these proceedings is, therefore, overruled.

13. This takes us to the consideration of the main twin contentions canvassed by learned senior counsel for the appellants for our consideration.

CONTENTION NO. 1 :

Applicability of the Market Act to appellants' transaction of purchase of sugarcane and sale of sugar and molasses.

14. So far as this contention is concerned, we have to keep in view the relevant provisions of the Market Act, Sugar Act as well as the Orders under the Essential Commodities Act.

15. In the first instance, we shall deal with the transactions of purchase of sugarcane by the sugar factories functioning in the market areas falling within the jurisdiction of respective market committees constituted under the Market Act. The Market Act has been enacted by the Bihar Legislature as per the legislative power vested in it by Entries 26, 27 and 28 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. These Entries read as under :

16. It becomes at once clear that if location of markets and fairs simpliciter and the management and maintenance thereof are only contemplated by the Market Act, then they would fall squarely within the topic of legislative power envisaged by Entry 28 of List II. However, the Market Act, as well will presently show, deal with supply and distribution of goods as well as trade and commerce therein as it seeks to regulate the sale and purchase of agricultural produce to be carried on in the specified markets under the Act. To that extent the provisions of Entry 33 of List III override the legislative powers of the State Legislature in connection with legislations dealing with trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of goods. Once we turn to Entry 33 of the Concurrent List, we find that on the topic of trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, goods enumerated therein at sub-clause (b), we find listed items of foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils. Thus to the extent to which the Market Act seeks to regulate the transactions of sale and purchase of sugarcane and sugar which are foodstuffs and trade and commerce therein, it has to be held that the Market Act being enacted under the topics of legislative powers under Entries 26, 27 and 28 of List II will be subject to any other legislation under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List. As it will be seen hereinafter, the Bihar Legislature itself has enacted the Sugarcane Act in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List and, therefore, the field covered by the Sugarcane Act would obviously remain exclusively governed by the Sugarcane Act and to the extent the latter Act carves out an independent field for its operation, the sweep of the general field covered by the Market Act which covers all types of agricultural produce, would pro tanto get excluded qua sugarcane and the products prepared out of it.

17. So far as the Market Act is concerned, it is necessary to note that it is an Act to pro-vide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State of Bihar and for matters connected therewith. The said Act is enacted essentially to protect the growers of agricultural produce in the State who on account of their ignorance, illiteracy and lack of collective bargaining power may get exploited by middlemen and economically strong purchasers of their agricultural produce with the result that the agriculturists may not get adequate price for their produce. It is with that end in view that the Market Act has been enacted. The constitutional validity of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, concerned with the regulation of purchase and sale of commercial crops grown by agriculturists was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M.C.V.S. Arunachala Nadar v. The State of Madras, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 92. Subba Rao J., speaking for the Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the said Act emphasised the necessity of such enactment with a view to protect the producers of commercial crops from being exploited by the middlemen and profiteers and to enable them to secure a fair return for their produce. The learned Judge referred to, with approval, the following recommendations of Royal Commission on Agriculture in India appointed in 1928.

Reference was also made to the Report of an Expert Committee appointed by the Government of Madras which graphically described the difficulties of the cultivators and their dependence upon the middlemen. The following is the extract from the Report of the Expert Committee as noted by Subba Rao J., for highlighting the need for regulated markets for cultivators of commercial crops.