Dinu v. State of Haryana, (SC) BS197700
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- K.T. Thomas and S.N. Phukan, JJ.

CrA No. 1194 of 2001. D/d. 23.11.2001.

Dinu And Another - Petitioners

Versus

State of Haryana - Respondent

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 379 and 332 Sentence - Whether to run concurrently and not consecutively - View of High Court stringent because, offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code was committed when appellants/accused were apprehended by police on commission of first offence - No reason for denying benefit of two sentences running concurrently - Interest of justice would only be served by directing that sentences of imprisonment under the two different counts would run concurrently.

[Para 3]

ORDER

Leave granted.

2. Appellants have been convicted under two counts of offences, one is section 332 and the other is Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- regarding the first count and rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the second count. The trial court did not mention whether the substantive part of the sentence of imprisonment under the two counts would run concurrently and hence, under Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code the sentence of imprisonment under one offence will start running only on the expiry of the sentence of imprisonment passed in respect of the other count. When the matter was taken up by the sessions court in appeal, this question was not brought to the notice of the sessions court, and therefore no direction was passed under Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But when a revision was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the question was additionally raised whether the sentence should run concurrently or consecutively. The High Court repelled that plea for which the following reason is given

3. We feel that the stand adopted by the High Court is too stringent a view because, the offence under section 332 Indian Penal Code was committed when the appellants were apprehended by the police on commission of the first offence. There is no particular reason for denying the benefit of the two sentences running concurrently. We feel that interest of justice would only be served by directing that the sentences of imprisonment under the two different counts would run concurrently. We do so.

4. This appeal is disposed of accordingly.

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