SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- H.K. Sema and Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 1853 of 2002. D/d. 19.4.2005.

Ram Chandra Shukla - Appellants

Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - Respondents

A. Service Law - Dismissal - Appellant a member of Higher Judicial Service - Rejection of bail application of accused charged in murder case by District Judge and thereafter by High Court - Subsequent bail application allowed by appellant-Addl. District and Sessions Judge even when no fresh cause was disclosed in that application - As per circular issued by District Judge, all the bail applications in District should be routed through District Judge and having known such circular, appellant committed flagrant disobedience thereof - Serious judicial misconduct by appellant attracting penalty of dismissal - Order of dismissed upheld - Appeal dismissed.

[Para 4]

B. Service Law - Misconduct - Bail applications of murder accused rejected by both the Courts below - Appellant, as Addl. District and Sessions Judge allowed the third bail application even when no fresh cause was disclosed - Argument that act of accused was not actuated by malice or dishonestly - Held, gravity of offence has to be judged and assessed with the nature of offence.

[Para 4]

ORDER

H.K. Sema, J. - Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The appellant was a member of the Higher Judicial Service in the State of Uttar Pradesh. At the relevant time, he was posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge at Etah, Uttar Pradesh. By order dated 17th April, 1997, his services were terminated, preceded by an inquiry conducted by a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court. The inquiry report submitted by the learned Judge was considered in a Full Court Meeting of the Allahabad High Court and the report was accepted. Pursuant thereto, his services were terminated. He filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed after threadbare discussion of the law. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

3. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the appellant, in his usual fairness, confined his submission to the quantum of punishment. It is his say that considering the fact that the offence committed by the appellant is only a fraction and not actuated with malice or dishonesty, the punishment of dismissal imposed on him is disproportionate with the offence charged and proved against him. We are unable to countenance this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.

4. Two charges were framed against the appellant. The first charge relates to the bail granted by him in Crime Case No.23 of 1994 under sections 147, 148, 149, 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The first application for bail of the accused was rejected by the Additional District and Sessions Judge and the second bail application was also rejected by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Mr. N.S. Gahlot, on 30th September, 1994. The accused thereafter filed an application for bail before the High Court, which was dismissed as not pressed. However, the appellant, as Additional District and Sessions Judge, allowed the third bail application even when no fresh cause was disclosed in that application. The second charge relates to the grant of bail to Shri Puran, accused, in Crime No.154 of 1994 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The application for bail of the accused was rejected by the District Judge, in-charge of the District, on 2nd June, 1994. Thereafter, the accused filed bail application before the High Court, which was rejected by order dated 28th November, 1994. However, subsequent bail application of the accused, Puran, was allowed by the appellant by his order dated 6th February, 1995. It is also on record that the District Judge, in-charge of the District, had issued circular dated 28th January, 1995, to the effect that all the bail applications in the District should be routed through the District Judge. Having known such circular and in flagrant disobedience thereof, the appellant exercised his jurisdiction and granted bail to the accused, as aforesaid. In the course of inquiry, after examining the evidence and documents on record, the learned Judge of the High Court found both the charges proved against the appellant. It is in these circumstances, learned counsel for the appellant fairly submits that his argument would be confined to the quantum of punishment. It is his say that the offence said to have been committed by the appellant is only a fraction and not actuated by malice or dishonesty, not involving the integrity of the appellant and, therefore, the punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant is disproportionate with the offence charged and proved. It is now well-settled principle of law that the gravity of offence has to be judged and assessed with the nature of offence. As a member of the Higher Judicial Service, it was not expected of the appellant to have granted bail to the accused which had earlier been rejected by the District Judge, in-charge of the District, and by the High Court. In fact, when the appellant granted bail to the accused, in one of the cases, the bail application was already pending before the High Court and only after obtaining bail from the appellant, the bail application pending before the High Court was got dismissed as not pressed. Keeping this in mind, we are of the view that it is a serious judicial misconduct on the part of the appellant which would attract the penalty of dismissal from service. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order dismissing the appellant from service, in the given facts and circumstances as recited above. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

5. We, however, note that by an interim order dated 6th May, 2002, this Court directed that the pendency of the appeal shall not come in the way of such monetary benefits being released to the appellant which are due and payable to him under the impugned order. Despite dismissal of this appeal, we direct that the appellant shall be paid the amount due to him within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order, if not already paid, and if he is otherwise entitled under the law.

6. No costs.

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