SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- S. Saghir Ahmad and R.P. Sethi, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 4528 of 1991. D/d. 23.9.1999.

M.P. Electricity Board and another - Appellants

Versus

Manju Singh Chauhan (MRS) Managing Director, Silencers India (P) LTD. - Respondent

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Sections 2(1)(g), 2(1)(o), 3, 14(1)(d) and 22(b) - Deficiency of service - Refusal in reduction of load by the Board was wholly in consonance with the terms of the agreement - Hence, there was no deficiency in service.

[Paras 8 and 9]

ORDER

S. Saghir Ahmad, J. - The respondent had contracted with the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board for the supply of 168 KVA electricity load through an agreement in writing which, inter alia, stipulated that on the request of the consumer, namely, the respondent, the load could be reduced.

2. On 23-3-1987, the respondent requested the Board for reduction of the maximum contracted load from 168 KVA to 100 KVA. This request was rejected by the appellants by their letter dated 23-5-1987 on the basis of clause 13(d) of the agreement. The respondent then approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for damages to the tune of Rs 20.05 lakhs. The claim was contested by the Board which also raised the question of maintainability of the claim petition on the ground that there being a contract in writing between the parties and the discretion having been left to the Board to reduce or not to reduce the load, there was no "deficiency of service" and the claim petition was not maintainable.

3. The National Commission by the impugned judgment, while disallowing the claim of the respondent for compensation, directed that the Board would bill the respondent from 23-5-1987 to 31-10-1987 on the basis of the maximum power demand of 100 KVA instead of 168 KVA. It is this direction which is challenged before us in this appeal.

4. Mr G.L. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Electricity Board has invited our attention to clause 13(d) of the agreement which is to the following effect:

"13. (d) On being satisfied that for certain compelling reasons the consumer is not or will not be in a position to consume electricity sufficient to have maximum demand equal to his contract demand, the Board may in its discretion allow the consumer, when request in writing is received in this regard, to reduce his contract demand to such extent and from such date as the Board may decide. Such reduction in the contract demand will be allowed not more than once during the period the agreement remains in force, but it shall not affect the consumer's liability to pay the amount of the minimum guarantee mentioned in clause 21(a) hereof."

5. He contended that in view of the discretion left to the Board under the aforesaid clause, it was open to the Board either to allow or refuse the request of the respondent for reduction of the load. It is contended that the Board considered the request of the respondent and then by a speaking order rejected the request. This was done wholly in accordance with the terms of the contract and, therefore, there was no "deficiency in service" as contemplated by the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and consequently, the claim petition before the National Commission was not maintainable.

6. The contention raised by Mr Sanghi is fully borne out by clause 13(d) of the agreement which gives an unqualified discretion to the Board to take its own independent decision whether it would allow a reduction in the sanctioned load agreed in writing to be supplied to the consumer. Once the Board, on a consideration of the relevant material, took the decision not to reduce the load, the consumer (respondent) cannot legally raise a grievance.

7. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the respondent to the following observation of the National Commission:

"On 14-7-1988, the opposite party (Electricity Board) while reiterating that the request for reduction of contract demand was not found feasible as being justified by compelling reasons, however, as a special case, reduction in the contract demand was permitted from 168 KVA to 143 KVA w.e.f. 1-8-1987 and to 126 KVA w.e.f. 1-4-1988. The contract demand was scaled down retrospectively and in the additional submissions of 5-9-1991 the respondent has explained that this was done in the light of the decisions taken by the M.P. Electricity Board on the representation of the Federation of M.P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry."

8. It is contended that the Board itself, after taking into consideration the circumstances, had reduced the load from 168 KVA to 143 KVA with effect from 1-8-1987 and again to 126 KVA with effect from 1-4-1988. It is contended that if the load could be reduced by the Board for the period indicated above, there was no reason why it could not have been reduced on the request of the respondent for the period in question. It was pointed out to the Commission that the reduction in the contracted load was done in the light of the decision taken by the Board on the representation of the Federation of M.P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry. They had given sufficient reason for the reduction granted to the respondent on the earlier occasion and that it could not be treated as a binding precedent.

9. We are firmly of the view that the action of the Board in refusing the reduction of the load from 168 KVA to 100 KVA as requested by the respondent was wholly in consonance with the terms of the agreement between the parties. That being so, there was no deficiency of service involved in this case and the claim petition was not maintainable before the National Commission under the Act.

10. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned direction given by the National Commission for billing the respondent for the period from 23-5-1987 to 31-10-1987 for 100 KVA is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.