SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- G.B. Pattanaik and U.C. Banerjee, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 7533 of 1995. D/d. 17.7.2001.

Skipper Tower (P) Ltd. - Appellant

Versus

Skipper Bhawan Flat Buyers' Assn. - Respondent

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 148 and Order 17 Rule 1 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Sections 309 and 314(3) - Adjournment - Sought by a counsel on the ground that he is not in a position to proceed with the matter inasmuch as he has been engaged recently in the case - Held, if a counsel accepts the engagement knowing full well that the matter is already on board, then the counsel must be prepared to proceed with the matter and is not entitled to take a plea that he or she is not in a position to proceed with the matter inasmuch as he or she has been engaged recently - Appeal dismissed on merits.

[Para 1]

ORDER

G.B. Pattanaik, J. - This appeal is directed against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dated 13-1-1995 passed in Original Petition No. 16 of 1991. When this appeal was called, Ms Kiran Suri, Advocate appearing for the appellant made a prayer that she has been engaged in this case only yesterday and "no-objection certificate" has been given by the previous Advocate-on-Record and as such she is not in a position to proceed with the matter and the matter may be adjourned. The respondent Skipper Bhawan Flat Buyers' Association is personally present through Col. Jaswant Singh and vehemently objects to any adjournment being given. Apart from the respondent's objection, we also find that there is an earlier judicial order rejecting the application for discharge of the Advocate-on-Record. Be that as it may, if a counsel accepts the engagement knowing full well that the matter is already on board, then the counsel must be prepared to proceed with the matter and is not entitled to take a plea that he or she is not in a position to proceed with the matter inasmuch as he or she has been engaged recently.

2. We have ourselves scrutinised the impugned order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. Having examined the said order and taking into account the facts of the case as well as the grounds taken in the appeal memo, we see no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission requiring our interference in the matter. The appellant, to say the least, does not deserve any sympathy or any equitable consideration in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Thus, in our view, neither in law nor on any equitable consideration, the impugned order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission requires interference by this Court.

3. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.