SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- A.P. Misra and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 4898 of 1991. D/d. 3.5.2000.

A. Abdul Rashid Khan (dead) - Appellants

Versus

P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid - Respondents

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sections 22 and 10 - Agreement to sell property held jointly - No bar for passing decree for specific performance with regard to share owned by contracting parties for which vendor can execute sale deed - Decree for specific performance can be only to the extent of transferring the share of vendor in such property - Partition and possession given in absence of other co-sharer there cannot be any decree of any specified part of property.

[Paras 13, 14 and 17]

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 22 - Suit for specific performance - Vendee on the date of filing suit not yet become owner of property, as he merely seeks right in the property through decree for specific performance - Even after decree for specific performance is passed, his right will only mature when he deposits the balance consideration and sale deed is actually executed - Order of High Court for partition of property and delivery of possession to plaintiff set aside - However, order of High Court decreeing suit for specific performance for execution of sale deed against appellants to extent their share upheld.

[Paras 15 and 17]

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 16(c) - Readiness and willingness - Laches - Obligation to execute sale deed arises within 60 days after documents tendered to plaintiff by defendant - Documents not tendered - Not correct to calculate period of 60 days from date of agreement itself to hold laches.

[Para 8]

D. Evidence Act, Section 92 - Written agreement to sell - Pleas and contentions beyond written agreement cannot be taken into consideration.

[Paras 4 and 11]

E. Words and Phrases - "Not proved" - Is different from "false" - Merely not able to prove cannot be in all cases categorised as false.

[Para 11]

Cases Referred :-

Abdul Rahman case, AIR 1999 Gauhati 101 (sic).

K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997(2) RCR (Civil) 312 (SC).

Manzoor Ahmed Magray v. Ghulam Hassan Aram, 1999(4) RCR (Civil) 597 (SC).

ORDER

A.P. Misra, J. - The following questions are raised in this appeal :-

(1) Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court is right in decreeing the suit for specific performance to the extent of the share of the appellants ?

(2) Whether the purported agreement of sale is one for the sale of the entire suit property and not for the sale of individual shares. Hence, whether the High Court is right in decreeing the suit only in respect of the shares of appellants 1 to 9 ?

(3) Whether in a suit for specific performance where alternative plea of partition is also raised, the High Court is right to decree the suit for partition ?

2. In order to appreciate the controversy, we are herewith giving a short gist of facts :

The suit property is a tiled house in Erode town which originally belonged to one Aziz Khan. On his death, his heirs under the Muslim Law, viz, appellants 1 to 9 who are bothers and respondents 2 and 3 who are sisters inherited the said property. According to the appellants, after negotiation for the sale of the said property with respondent 1, agreement of sale was purported to be executed between the appellants and respondents No. 2 and 3 on the one hand and respondent 1 on the other hand. Some dispute is raised with reference to two documents viz. Exhibit A-1 which is said to be the original sale agreement produced by the plaintiff-respondent from his possession and the other is Exhibit B-1 produced by the appellants. Both these documents according to the appellants are original. The distinguishing difference between the two documents is that Exhibit A-1 is purported to be signed by respondent No. 1 while Exhibit B-1 is not signed by respondent. It is not in dispute that the aforesaid two sisters, viz., respondents 2 and 3 did not sign either of the two agreements. This agreement of sale is dated 8.11.1978. In spite of the said agreement, when sale deed was not executed, plaintiff-respondent 1 issued notice dated 29.11.1979 for the execution of the sale deed. The notice states that though the appellants assured and undertook to get the signatures of respondents 2 and 3, they did not do so. In any case in the alternative the appellants are bound and thus they should execute the sale deed to the extent of their share in the property. The appellants denied these allegations of the notice. Thereafter, respondent 1 filed the present suit for specific performance of the aforesaid sale agreement dated 8.11.1978 and for the partition and separate possession of their ⅚th share in the said property. A written statement was filed by appellant 1 which was adopted by the other appellant 2 to 9. They denied that they gave any assurance or promise to obtain the signatures of their sisters. They fulfilled all their obligations and it is the plaintiff who did not and was never willing and ready to perform his part of the obligations and that this suit is filed only to avoid the forfeiture of his advance money. Initially, rupees five thousand was paid by the plaintiff as per the agreement of sale. A plea was raised in the additional written statement that the sale could only be one indivisible sale in respect of the entire property for which all the heirs, viz., defendants 1 to 11 (appellants 1 to 9 and respondents 2 and 3 herein) must join. Admittedly the sisters have not joined in this agreement of sale. The appellant's case is that as it was the plaintiff who undertook to obtain the signatures of their sisters which he could not hence the suit must fail.

3. The trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that the agreement dated 8.11.1978, was indivisible and could only be executed if all the defendants joined and that the plaintiff was also not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff-respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court held that the plaintiff had not pleaded and proved that respondents 2 and 3 agreed to sell the said property, hence it cannot be held that the said agreement was by all the defendants. As respondents 2 and 3 admittedly did not join the contract they cannot be held bound by the said agreement. However, it further held that defendants 1 to 9 agreed and entered into the said agreement with the plaintiff, hence were bound by it. It further held that the said agreement was not contingent upon signing by respondents 2 and 3. The case pleaded in the additional written statement was a new case and an after-thought. In other words, the High Court held, it couldn't be said that it was an indivisible contract. So, a valid and enforceable contract exists only between the plaintiff and the appellants. The trial Court erroneously disentitled the plaintiff to the relief of specific performance on account of laches. Thus the suit of respondent No. 1 for specific performance was decreed as against the appellants. It also decreed the suit in respect of the alternative relief viz., for the partition of the suit property into six equal shares by metes and bounds, and delivery of separate possession to the plaintiff of its five such shares.

4. At the outset, we may consider the case of the appellants, as contained in the additional written statement that it was understood between the parties that the plaintiff would obtain the signatures of respondents 2 and 3 and that the sale deed would be executed as one composite sale deed of the entire property. On the contrary, the case of respondent 1 is that the appellants undertook to get the signatures of their sisters. They are all pleas and contentions which are not bone out from the agreement and sale. These are pleas by both the parties beyond the said written agreement. The law in this regard is well settled, in view of section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act; where any contract is required by law to be reduced in writing, then no oral evidence or understanding to the contrary or what is apart from the said contract would be admissible in law. It is not in dispute in the present case, the agreement of sale was reduced to writing which was for an immovable property. Hence, these pleas, both of the appellants and respondent No. 1, as aforesaid being beyond the written agreement of sale cannot be taken into consideration.

5. So far as the contention for the appellant is concerned that there are two original agreements of sale, viz., Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit B-1 and the one in the possession of the appellants, Exhibit B-1 being not signed by respondent 1 shows there was no concluded contract and hence signature of respondent 1 in Exhibit A-1 was also not there and it was only later signed which was not there on the alleged date and time of the agreement of sale. After giving our consideration we have no hesitation that the trial Court wrongly accepted this case of the appellant and the High Court rightly rejected the same. We find that in the original written submission itself there is admission by the appellant. Relevant portion is reproduced below :

".............defendants were always ready and willing to execute the documents......... Due to the plaintiff's default the agreement has come to an end in the month of September, 1979."

6. This statement that the defendants were always ready and willing to execute the documents admits the existence of a valid agreement of sale. Further averment that the agreement came to an end in the month of September 1979 also confirms the admission by the defendants-appellants that the said agreement continued and was valid till September, 1979. In other words, they admit the existence of an agreement which continued till 1979. Thus submission of the appellants has no merit.

7. The next submission for the appellants is that the trial Court was right in holding that respondent 1 was not ready and willing and did not perform his obligation, hence suit for specific performance should not have been decreed by the High Court. The reason for the trial Court holding so was that respondent 1 had slept over the matter and was lethargic for more than 4 to 5 months and it is only after the hike in prices he had chosen to send the notice on 30.11.1979. Hence, these laches indicate that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation. On the other hand, submission for respondent 1 is that there was no delay on the part of the plaintiff, if at all, it was on account of the appellants themselves. He referred to the agreement of sale as to when the obligation of the plaintiff arises to execute the sale deed. Learned counsel referred to the agreement under which the sale deed was not be executed within 60 days from the date of the document of title, the High Court order given by the appellants to the plaintiff and that not having been done would not constitute any laches or failure on the part of the plaintiff. We have pursued the agreement of sale. The relevant portion of the same is quoted below :-

"..............Individuals 1 to 11 agree to obtain the copy of the judgment of the High Court by which all of them acquired the right and decree copy under all the documents relating to the property mentioned hereunder and after giving all the copies and from that day within the stipulated period of 60 days, Individual 12 (respondent No. 1) among us shall finalise the sale at his costs........".

8. The aforesaid quotation clearly indicates that the obligation to get the sale deed executed was to be within sixty days after the documents referred to therein are tendered to the plaintiff by the defendant which in the present case has yet not been done. Hence, the trial Court fell in error in calculating period of 60 days from the date of agreement itself to hold laches. In our considered opinion, the obligation to execute the document arises only after the documents are tendered by the plaintiff to the defendant (sic to the plaintiff by the defendant). Hence, the findings of the trial Court on this count cannot be sustained and the High Court is right in setting aside this finding of the trial Court.

9. The next submission for the appellant was that as the plaintiff's case was found to be false, no relief for specific performance should be granted since such a relief is only a discretionary relief. Submission is, the case set up by the plaintiff that the appellants undertook to get the signatures of their sisters on the agreement of sale having been found to be false, this discretionary relief should not be granted. Firstly, we find that there is no such finding that the plaintiff spoke falsehood. The reliance of the appellant is on the following part of the High Court judgment where it held :-

".......even assuming that it has not been proved, is not a very material allegation which is found to be false."

10. Learned counsel has perhaps missed the preceding line of the said sentence where a similar submission made on behalf of the appellants was rejected by the High Court. The submission made before the High Court was that the plaintiff's allegation that defendants No. 1 to 9 assured and undertook to get defendants 10 and 11 to sign the agreement on the sale deed is false. But the High Court in the next sentence reads :-

"But, this contention has no merits."

11. It seems the appellants seek to place reliance on that portion which has been quoted hereinbefore, where the High Court proceeds by saying, even assuming it to be so. This apart, this part of the case falls away from the written agreement of sale, as we have held would be inadmissible under section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is difference between "Not proved" and "false". Merely not able to prove cannot be in all cases categorised as false. Thus we find that even this submission for the appellants has no merits.

12. Next, submission is made on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, viz., the sisters that no suit for specific performance should have been decreed without they joining, as part of the property is only a small house about which partition is not possible and hence, grant of decree of partition in the alternative is not sustainable. A submission has also been made that there exists right of pre-emption to the sisters and thus first offer should have been given to the sisters to purchase this property hence the suit for specific performance must fail on this score. He relied on the following decisions :-

(1) 21 IC 528 (Cal.)

(2) Abdul Rahman case reported in AIR 1999 Gauhati 101 (sic)

(3) K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997(2) RCR (Civil) 312 (SC) .

13. We have perused these decisions. None of them applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. So far as the right of pre-emption is concerned, that has not been raised in any of the Courts below by any party and cannot be permitted to be raised in this appeal for the first time. In fact, there is no pleading or evidence in this regard. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondent 1 has placed reliance on Manzoor Ahmed Magray v. Ghulam Hassan Aram, 1999(4) RCR (Civil) 597 (SC) : 1999(7) SCC 703. This was also a suit for specific performance of a contract of an agreement of sale of an orchard. The Court held that there is no bar for passing the decree for specific performance with regard to ⅓rd of ⅔rd share owned by the contracting parties for which he can execute the sale deed.

14. Thus we have no hesitation to hold, even where any property is held jointly, and once any party to the contract has agreed to sell such joint property by agreement, then, even if the other co-sharer has not joined, at least to the extent of his share, he is bound to execute the sale deed. However, in the absence of the other co-sharer, there could not be any decree of any specified part of the property to be partitioned and possession given. The decree could only be to the extent of transferring the share of the appellants in such property to other such contracting party. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellants have ⅚th share in the property. So, the plaintiff's suit for specific performance to the extent of this ⅚th share was rightly decreed by the High Court which requires no interference.

15. So far as the other part of the High Court's order by which it decreed the alternative relief of respondent 1 for partition of the suit property in six equal shares by metes and bounds and delivering separate possession over these such shares is concerned, on the face of it is erroneous and cannot be sustained, in a suit for specific performance. The vendee on the date of filing this suit has not yet become the owner of this property, as he merely seeks right in the said property through the decree of specific performance. When the sale deed itself has yet to be executed, his right in the property has not yet matured, how can he claim partition and possession over it ? Even after decree is passed, his right will only mature when he deposits the balance consideration and the sale deed is actually executed. This apart, how could there be any partition in the property, without the other co-sharers joining, who are not part of (party to ?) the disputed agreement ? No issue is framed between them. No evidence led. Hence, we find that the High Court was not right in decreeing this alternative prayer of partition in this suit.

16. Learned counsel for respondent 1 fairly states that he is not able to support this part of the High Court order. However, he prays that the plaintiffs' right in future date of partition be not in jeopardy because of these findings.

17. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is party allowed, to the extent the High Court's order for the partition of the suit property and delivery of possession to the plaintiff is set aside but the other part of the High Court's order decreeing the suit for specific performance for the execution of the sale deed as against by the appellants, to the extent of their ⅚th share is upheld. We make it clear that setting aside of the High Court's order to the extent of partitioning of the specified share is only on account of such claim being made premature. This in no way would prejudice the right of respondent 1 (plaintiff) in future, if he becomes co-sharer of this property.

18. The appeal is accordingly partly allowed. Costs on the parties.

Appeal partly allowed.