Samrat Shipping v. Dolly George, (SC)
BS12826
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Before:- K.T. Thomas and M.B. Shah, JJ.
Criminal Appeal No. 1330 of 1999. D/d.
10.12.1999
Samrat Shipping - Appellant
Versus
Dolly George - Respondent
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138, 139, 141 and 142 - Complaint by company - Dismissal of complaint on ground that individual has not produced certified copy of resolution of Board of Directors of petitioner-company authorising him to represent the company - Is too hasty action - Impugned order set aside - Trial Court directed to proceed with trial and dispose it of in accordance with law.
[Para 3]
ORDER
K.T. Thomas, J. - Leave granted.
2. The appellant-company has filed a complaint before a Magistrate Court for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no resolution of the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Company authorising the person who represented the Company before the Magistrate Court. Though appellant preferred a revision before the Sessions Court that became futile and he moved the High Court invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Single Judge dismissed the petition of the appellant in spite of the fact that appellant produced a copy of the resolution for showing that the Company had authorised the particular individual to present the complaint before the Court. The High Court while dismissing the petition observed thus :
"Having heard the parties' counsel and after going through the record it appears that the resolution which has been filed on record of this Court is not certified by any person at page 13. If it is uncertified copy, how far it could be taken to be a correct and true copy. But nobody is inclined to take responsibility about its correctness. It is a matter of grave doubt that such a resolution should allure to the benefit of the petitioner for, it is a criminal prosecution. Authorisation to prosecute, being of the nature of sanction, the Board of Directors is supposed to apply their mind to the facts and circumstances of each case before authorising any person to prosecute any person for any offence in the submission of the L.D. Counsel. It appears plausible at least for the present purpose for no application has ever been filed before any Court seeking permission to take additional evidence excepting what is filed in this Court for the first time."
3. Having heard both sides we find it difficult to support the orders challenged before us. A Company can file a complaint only through human agency. The person who presented the complaint on behalf of the company claimed that he is the authorised representative of the company. Prima facie, the trial Court should have accepted it at the time when a complaint was presented. If it is a matter of evidence when the accused disputed the authority of the said individual to present the complaint, opportunity should have been given to the complainant to prove the same, but that opportunity need be given only when the trial commences. The dismissal of the complaint at the threshold on the premise that the individual has not produced certified copy of the resolution appears to be too hasty an action. We therefore, set aside the impugned orders and direct the trial Court to proceed with the trial and dispose it off in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 31.1.2000.
Appeal allowed.