Distt. Manager, APSRTC v. K. Sivaji, (SC) BS11938
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- S. Rajendra Babu and S.N. Variava, JJ.

Civil Appeal Nos. 496-97 of 1999. D/d. 30.11.2000

Distt. Manager, APSRTC - Appellant

Versus

K. Sivaji - Respondent

For the Appellant :- Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, Ms. Madhurima Tatia, Mr. Guntur Prabhakar and Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, Advocates.

A. Constitution of India, Article 12 - Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, Section 3 - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 68A - Andhra Pradesh Factories and Establishments (National Festival and other Holidays) Act, 1974, Section 11(1)(c) - Words Establishments "under the control of the Government" used in Section 11(1)(c) of the 1974 Act and in Article 12 of the Constitution are to be given the same meaning - State Road Transport Corporations established under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corpn. Act are under the direct and full control of the State Governments - Merely because the State Government establishes a Corporation and is an establishment distinct from the State Government does not ipso facto mean that the Corporation is not under the control of the State Government - Section 68A(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act merely states that a state transport service and undertaking may be carried on by the Central Government, State Government or any corporation or company thereof - The provisions of the said Act would not apply by virtue of Section 11(1)(c) of 1975 Act.

[Paras 3 to 7]

B. Constitution of India, Articles 215 and 216 - Binding precedents and judgments - A decision of a Full Bench is binding on the smaller/single bench - A single Judge while sitting singly cannot take a different view on the same point of law - Judicial discipline requires that he should either follow it or ask for a reference of the matter to a larger Bench.

[Para 3]

JUDGMENT

S.N. Variava, J. - These appeals are against a judgment dated 5th August 1986 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows :

3. At this stage, it must be mentioned that before the High Court the appellant had relied upon a judgment delivered by a concurrent Bench of the same Court, wherein it has been held that once an establishment is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India it would clearly show that it was under the control of the Central or the State Government. The High Court noticed this judgment as commented as follows :

It is seen from the judgment that the learned Judge examined the Memorandum and the Articles of Association of this company (H.M.T) and held :

On the basis, the High Court refused to follow that judgment. We have also read that judgment. It is clear from the reading of that judgment that it has been categorically held that both in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act, the words "under the control of the Government" are used. It has been held that the same meaning has to be ascribed to both. It has been held that if an establishment was a State within the meaning of Article 12, then it would be under the control of the Government for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. Having so held, the Court then considered the Memorandum and Articles of Association by stating as under :

It is thus clear that the decision that if an establishment is a State within the meaning of Article 12, then it is under the control of the Government for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c), is not based upon an examination of the Memorandum and Articles of Association. This decision was binding on the learned Judge hearing the writ petition. Judicial discipline required that he either follow it or refer the matter to a larger Bench. Sitting singly the learned Judge could not have taken a different view on the specious ground that the decision was based on facts. It must be mentioned that, as is pointed out hereinafter, even on facts the conclusion of the Learned Judge is unsustainable.

4. At this stage it must be mentioned that Mr. Nageshwar Rao has very fairly stated that the Appellant Corporation does not want to and will not recover the amounts paid to the employees by virtue of the orders passed. He submits that the appellants merely want the correct position in law established. We accept this statement and proceed to decide these appeals.

5. The appellant had been established under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act. Section 3 empowers the State Government to establish a Road Transport Corporation so that (a) advantages can be offered to the public, trade and industry by development of road transport, (b) there could be co- ordination of different forms of road transport, and (c) facilities for road transport could be extended and improved by an efficient and economical system of road transport service. This, therefore, were the sovereign functions which would otherwise have been performed by the State Government itself. However the Act permits the State Government to delegate these functions to a Road Transport Corporation established by it. Section 5 provides that the superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of a Corporation would vest in a Board of Directors. Section 5 further provides that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other Directors as the State Government may think fit to appoint. It also empowers the State Government to appoint one of the Directors as the Vice-Chairman of the board. Section 8 empowers the State Government to remove or terminate from office the Chairman or other Directors of the Corporation. Under Section 34 of the Act, the State Government may give to the Corporation general instructions which should be followed by the Corporation, and such instructions and directions may pertain to recruitment, conditions of service and training of its employees, wages to be paid to the employees, reserves to be maintained and disposals of profits and stocks. Section 34 also provides that a Corporation could not depart from the general instructions issued by the State Government. Under Section 35 the Corporation has to furnish returns, statistics, accounts and other information to the State Government. Under Section 36 the State Government has the power to make such inquiries as it chooses and if on the inquiries it was felt necessary, then by virtue of Section 37, the State Government may authorise any person to take over the Corporation and administer it. Section 38 also gives to the State Government a power to supersede the Corporation. All these provisions clearly show that the State Government has absolute control over the appellant Corporation.

6. The words used in Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act are "any factory or establishment under the control of the Central or any State Government". In Article 12 of the Constitution of India the words used are "under the control of Government of India." Thus, under both of them what is essential is control of the Government. We, therefore, fail to see as to how an establishment, which is deemed to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, would not be under the control of the Government for purposes of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. Reliance on Section 68A by the High Court is entirely misplaced. Section 68A(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act merely states that a State transport undertaking means any undertaking providing road transport service and such undertaking may be carried on (i) by the Central Government, or (ii) any Road Transport Corporation established under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, or (iii) by any Municipality or Corporation or Company owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government. As seen, under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, it is the State Government who may either perform the function itself or establish a Corporation, which would be performing functions which are basically public functions. Merely because the State Government establishes a Corporation and that Corporation is an establishment distinct from the State Government does not ipso facto mean that the Corporation is not under the control of the State Government. This very vital aspect appears to have been lost sight of by the learned Judge.

7. In our view, it is clear that the appellant Corporation is under the control of the State Government. Therefore, the provisions of the said Act would not be applicable to it by virtue of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. Accordingly the appeals are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

Appeals allowed.