Sumangala Naganath v. Union of India, (SC)
BS11895
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Before:- S. Rajendra Babu and S.N. Phukan, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 7517 of 1995. D/d.
7.4.1999
Sumangala Naganath - Appellant
Versus
Union of India - Respondents
Constitution of India, Article 138 - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, Section 15 - Judicial Review of the policy decision - Appellant appointed as Assistant Security Officer in Railway Protection Force - Later on appellant appointed in IRPS - Appointment of appellant to IRPS challenged - Appointment quashed by Tribunal - Held, appointment of the appellant is in terms of the Rule and fulfils the conditions of eligibility - Not open to Tribunal to examine the wisdom of Rule - A policy decision is not debatable in a judicial forum - Appointment according to rules - Tribunal cannot quash appointment on grounds of suitability.
[Para 5]
JUDGMENT
S. Rajendra Babu, J. - The appellant had appeared for the combined U.P.S.C. examination; that on selection was allotted to the Railway Protection Force. She was appointed as Assistant Security Officer, Group 'A' on 2.9.1981. A notification was issued by the Railway Board to fill up 50% of the vacancies in the Senior Scale of Indian Railway Personnel Service from other services under the Ministry of Railways in terms of Rule 8-1(c)(ii) of the said Notification dated 20.12.1975. The appellant applied for absorption in the Senior Scale of I.R.P.S. The Ministry of Railway processed the matter and after consulting the UPSC, the appellant was appointed as Senior Scale Officer in the Senior Scale of IRPS on 1.8.1989.
2. An application was filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, challenging the validity of the Rule 8-1(c)(ii) and also the appointment of the appellant to IRPS. The Tribunal upheld the validity of the said Rule but quashed the appointment of the appellant. That part of the order by which the Rule has been upheld is not in challenge before us and has become final.
3. Now the only question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the Tribunal in quashing the appointment of the appellant in IRPS, Senior Scale is correct or not. The Tribunal in setting aside the order of appointment of the appellant to IRPS considered certain factors : firstly, that on an earlier occasion in the year 1986, a request had been made to the UPSC for lateral induction of the appellant in the senior time scale of IRPS with a proposal for amendment of the recruitment Rules but was not accepted by the UPSC. UPSC felt that the RPF and IRPS are two separate and distinct cadres and their amalgamation at any level cannot be entirely in keeping with the spirit of the system under which candidates appearing at a common examination and opt for or getting allotted to different services on the basis of their choice, perception or suitability and relative position in the Merit List of successful candidates. The Tribunal was in fact persuaded by this reasoning. Secondly the Tribunal felt that on present occasion when UPSC accepted the recommendation to appoint appellant was kept in the dark as to the earlier correspondence on this aspect of the matter. Thirdly it was noticed by the Tribunal that such a lateral induction of the RPF officers in IRPS would not serve any purpose because the kind of the service which she has been discharging is altogether different and the services of the RPF which is an army and experience gained there cannot be utilised in the IRPS.
4. In challenging the order under appeal, learned Counsel for the appellant has pointed out that when the Tribunal had upheld the validity of the Rules and as long as the appointment made, falls within the description of the officer eligible for appointment under those Rules, there was hardly any option for the Tribunal not to have extended that benefit to the appellant. Learned counsel for the UOI has supported the stand of the appellant. On behalf of the contesting respondents, the arguments urged before the Tribunal are reiterated and the learned Counsel strongly supports the view taken by the Tribunal. The relevant Rule reads as under :
"Rule 8 : Future Maintenance of Service - (1) After the initial constitution of the service has been completed, vacancies shall be filled in the manner as hereafter provided -
(a) and (b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(c) Senior Scale - Senior Personnel Officer/Divisional Personnel Officer -
(iii) 50 per cent of the vacancies in the senior scale shall be filled by transfer of officers belonging to Class-I services under the Ministry of Railways (excluding the Indian Railway Medical Services) who have completed six years of service in the Junior scale or two years service in the grade of Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Railways and elect on the basis of an option, to be appointed to the service :
Provided that an officer who is eligible to exercise an option under these rules fails to do so at the first available opportunity shall not be given another opportunity to exercise an option at any future occasion."
5. The Rule clearly sets out that 50% of the vacancies in the Senior Scale will have to be filled by transfer of officers belonging to Class I services under the Ministry of Railways. However, it excludes the Indian Railway Medical Service. The class of the services which are intended to be excluded are clearly spelt out and it is the Indian Railway Medical Service and not any other service under the control of Ministry of Railway, when the fact that the appellant was serving in the Ministry of Railway is not in dispute. It is hardly open to anyone to state that she is not eligible to be considered for appointment to IRPS under the Rule referred to above. It was not open to the Tribunal to examine the wisdom of making such a Rule which enables them to make such lateral induction into IRPS. Such a question is a matter of policy and not debatable in a judicial forum. When appointment of the appellant is in terms of that Rule and fulfils all conditions of eligibility, the Tribunal could not state whether she is suitable to be appointed or not. What baffles us most is that in spite of the Rule clearly enabling appointment of the appellant, the Tribunal should have been persuaded by the view of the UPSC expressed earlier. When UPSC accepted recommendation on the present occasion, it is not known as to whether the Tribunal could imagine that the opinion expressed earlier was not known to it. The assumption appears to be wholly incorrect.
6. In the circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.