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Scope And Extent Of Review Jurisdiction Of The Court

1. The dictionary meaning of the word review is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". As explained by the Apex Court in S. Nagraj and others v. State of Karnataka and another 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. The purpose of review is rectification of an order which stems from the fundamental principle that the justice is above all and it is exercised only to correct the error which has occurred by some accident without any blame.

2. The power of a Civil Court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC and the grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, which imposes definitive limits to the exercise of power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits because it would be the province of a Court of appeal. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is reproduced as under:-

"REVIEW : 1. Application For Review Of Judgment.

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved -

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which, no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review or judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation : The fact that the decision on question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.

3. The first principle for exercising power of review is that it cannot be exercised as an inherent power. It must either be conferred by the law either specifically or by necessary implication. As held in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, the power of review is very much endowed upon High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being a court of plenary jurisdiction, in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Such power of review is to be exercised within the definitive limits, for which the grounds provided under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC provides sufficient guidance. The object and ambit of power of review has been explained by the Supreme court in Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through LRs and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others 2020(12) Scale 415, in following terms:-

`...9. To appreciate the scope of review, it would be proper for this Court to discuss the object and ambit of section 114 CPC as the same is a substantive provision for review when a person considering himself aggrieved either by a decree or by an order of Court from which appeal is allowed but no appeal is preferred or where there is no provision for appeal against an order and decree, may apply for review of the decree or order as the case may be in the Court, which may order or pass the decree. From the bare reading of section 114 CPC, it appears that the said substantive power of review under section 114 CPC has not laid down any condition as the condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the said Section imposed any prohibition on the Court for exercising its power to review its decision. However, an order can be reviewed by a Court only on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, which has been elaborately discussed hereinabove. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the Court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC itself. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power can be exercised in the guise of power of review....'

4. The parameters provided in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are three-fold, i.e., discovery and new and important evidence or matter, which after exercising due diligence was not in the knowledge of the person seeking review; mistake or error apparent on the face of record and any other ground which analogous to the aforesaid two grounds. In order to appreciate the workability, scope and extent of these grounds, it is imperative for us to delineate the principles as settled by the courts from time to time.

I. Discovery of new and important matter or evidence

5. When review is sought on the ground that some new evidence or matter has been discovered, the onus is on the party seeking review to show that such matter or evidence is relevant and it should be of such character that if same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. Mere discovery of new evidence or new matter alone is not sufficient to seek review, it must necessarily of such importance having potential to change the view taken by the court at the first instance. The further controlling circumstance for seeking review on this ground is that the party seeking review has to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after due diligence same could not have been produced before the court earlier. The court before entertaining review on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence is required to record its satisfaction about the three aspects, which can also be called as "triple test" i.e., (i) new matter/evidence discovered is of such nature which could change the judgment (ii) such new matter/evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review (iii) same could not be produced before court even after due diligence. When any of the conditions of the test, as laid down above is not fulfilled, "discovery of new matter/evidence" ipso facto would not be sufficient ground for the court to interfere with the finality of the judgment.

6. This was the view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of "The State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and others 2008 (8) SCC 612", wherein the apex court had laid down the conditions required for seeking review of the judgment on the ground of "discovery of new matter or evidence". The relevant para of the judgment reads as under:-

`.....14. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justiciae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court earlier....'

II. Mistake or Error apparent on the face of record

7. A mere error whether factual or legal is not sufficient to invoke review jurisdiction because as has also been observed the Apex Court in Asharfi Devi (D) Thr LRs v. State of U.P. and others 2019(5) SCC 86, in order to attract the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code, the error/mistake must be apparent on the face of the record of the case. As the phrase suggests, an error or mistake to be a ground to seek review must be such, which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require a long-drawn process of reasoning to reach the conclusion that there has been a mistake or error. A mistake which is discovered after a process of reasoning would not qualify to be "an error apparent". The following observations explaining the meaning of "error apparent on the face of record" in "Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 are worth noting: -

"An error which has to be established by a longdrawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from selfevident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ."

8. Only a "patent error" and not a "mere wrong decision" can be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the court held that error apparent must be something more than a mere error and must be one which is manifest on the face of the record. Similar observations were made by the Apex Court in the case of Parison Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 holding that an error which has to be detected by reasoning can hardly be called as an error apparent on the face of record. It was observed as under:-

"9. Under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not selfevident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."

9. Thus, a mistake or error which the party pleads for seeking review must be one which is self-evident, if a matter is required to be first reheard and then corrected, it would be an appeal under the guise of review. The courts have time and again emphasized on the narrow difference which exists between an appeal and a review. The courts exercising review jurisdiction have been time and again cautioned to not to walk on the path of reassessment of the judgment while hearing review application. While doing so, the courts have evolved "multiple facets" explaining scope and extent of "mistake or error apparent on the face of record" as a ground for seeking review.

10. Merely because a document which was forming part of the record was not considered at the time of deciding the case cannot be categorized as a mistake or error apparent on the face of record as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the Aribam Tuleshwar Sharmma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and others (1974) 4 SCC 389. Such ground is the province of a court of appeal as under appellate jurisdiction, the court may correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court, but the review court can only review a mistake/error which is apparent on the face of record. An erroneous decision on merits cannot be a ground of review. The observations of the court reads as under:-

`....The Judicial Commissioner gave two reasons for reviewing his predecessor's order. The first was that his predecessor had overlooked two important documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 which showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites even in the year 1948-49 and that the grants must have been made even by then. The second was that there was a patent illegality in permitting the appellant to question, in a single writ petition, settlement made in favour of different respondents. We are afraid that neither of the reasons mentioned by the learned Judicial Commissioner constitutes a ground for review. It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 1909] there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.

In the present case both the grounds on which the review was allowed were hardly grounds for review. That the two documents which were part of the record were not considered by the Court at the time of issue of a writ under Article 226 cannot be a ground for review especially when the two documents were not even relied upon by the parties in the affidavits filed before the Court in the proceedings under Article 226. Again that several instead of one writ petition should have been filed is a mere question of procedure which certainly would not justify a review. We are, therefore, of the view that the Judicial Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in allowing the review. The order of the Judicial Commissioner dated December 7, 1967 is accordingly set aside and the order dated May 25, 1965, is restored. The appeal is allowed but without costs...'

11. After quoting the passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (Supra) with approval, the apex court once again reiterated in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170, that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. The ratio laid down in the case of Parsion Devi (supra), Meera Bhanja (supra) and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra) was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sasi (D) Through Lrs. v. Aravindakshan Nair and others AIR 2017 SC 1432, and following observations were made: -

`...6. The grounds enumerated therein are specific. The principles for interference in exercise of review jurisdiction are well settled. The Court passing the order is entitled to review the order, if any of the grounds specified in the aforesaid provision are satisfied.

7. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1372 the Court while dealing with the scope of review had opined:

"What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an `error apparent on the face of the record'). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an `error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by `error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error."

8. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, 1997(4) RCR (Civil) 458 : (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Court after referring to Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (supra), Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389, held thus:-

"Under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise""

12. It is further settled that the power of review is to be exercised for "correction of mistake" and not for "substitution of view". In Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, (1999) 9 SCC 596, the apex court observed that a review cannot be claimed for fresh hearing of the matter or for correction of an erroneous view taken on earlier point of time. The error of law or fact of which correction is being sought must "stare in the face" without needing an elaborate argument for establishing same. The observations of the court reads as under:-

"....30. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression 'any other sufficient reason' used in Order 47, Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the Rule..."

13. In the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224, apex court observed and held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Only because there was a possibility of two views and the court had chosen to adopt one, can never be ground for review. A review cannot be an appeal in disguise. The observations of the court in this regard are as under: -

`....56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. ...'

14. The re-appreciation of evidence for finding the mistake or error in the judgment is beyond the scope and purview of the review jurisdiction. If in any case the court is required to reappreciate the evidence in order to find out the error/mistake in the judgment, it would amount to re-hearing of case which is domain of an appellate court. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. & Ors., (2005)6 SCC 651, clarifying this aspect, held as under:-

"10. .......In a review petition it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."

15. The order of the High court reviewing its judgment was held to be bad by the Apex court in Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai AIR 2003 SC 2095 on the ground that the High Court entered upon the exercise of reappreciation of evidence without first satisfying itself that order suffers from such an error which could lead to failure of justice. Unless and until, such an error exists, order cannot be reviewed. The relevant observations of the court are as follows:-

`...5. On a perusal of the order under challenge it is clear that the High Court without considering the question whether the judgment/order sought to be reviewed suffered from any error, entered upon the exercise of reappreciating the evidence and on such reappreciation of evidence redetermined the compensation by reducing the amount to the extent noted earlier.

6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.

7. Coming to the merits of the case, suffice it to say that on perusal of the order, which has been reviewed by the order under challenge did not suffer from any serious illegality, which called for correction by exercise of review jurisdiction.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inderchand Jain (D) through L.Rs v. Motilal (D) through L.Rs (2009) 14 SCC 663, reiterated the aforesaid view and held that re-appreciation of evidence is beyond the review jurisdiction.

17. A repetition of old and concluded argument, which was not accepted by the court at first instance, is not enough to repone the concluded adjudications. If once an argument does not get imprimatur of the court and the case was decided, the party cannot seek a rehearing of the original matter. The Apex Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501 by referring to a review petition seeking review on same relief and grounds as pleaded in original petition, observed that such "second innings" is impressible under guise of review and held as under :

"11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.

12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of "second innings" which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."

18. Even a failure to argue a point at the time of hearing of the matter by the court, is also not a ground for seeking review as it would be a case where the existing material was overlooked by counsel and not a case of excusable misfortune or mistake. This was so observed by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Ray and Ors, AIR 1975 Ori. 64, holding as follows:-

"Failure to argue a point is not an envisagable ground for review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, according to which in only three cases mere review is permitted. Those cases are where new material has been overlooked by excusable misfortune, mistake or there is an error apparent on the face of record and where there is 'any other sufficient reason'. The present case is not covered by the first two classes of cases. No new material has been overlooked by excusable misfortune or mistake; it is a case of an existing material being overlooked by the counsel and not a case of excusable misfortune nor a mistake. There is also no error apparent on the face of record."

19. A perusal of the aforesaid precedents leaves no doubt that the Courts have repeatedly held that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal. It is a reluctant resort only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The path on which the review court has to walk upon is indeed very narrow and guarded by the definitive limits. It has to make sure that while deciding review, it shall not transgress the limits and enter province of an appellate court. A petition seeking review cannot be entertained at drop of hat. "Any" or "every" mistake is not sufficient for invoking review jurisdiction. Mistake has to be such which is apparent and manifest on the face of record and if not corrected, would result into miscarriage of justice. There is no definitive test laid down to assess as to which mistake will be an error apparent on the face of record. From perusal of the judicial precedents as discussed above, it transpires that a mistake to be apparent shall be "self-evident" and "stare in the face" of it. If a mistake has to be discovered after examining the record and requires an argument to establish it, such mistake or error would be not be "apparent on the face of record" and would cease to qualify as a ground for seeking review. What is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it is thus, left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.

20. The observations of Apex court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others AIR 2000 SC 3737 are worth noting here wherein an argument was raised before the court that in every case where there is "injustice", the Court should not feel shackled by rules of procedure nor constrained by the limited scope of a review application. The argument was rejected by the court after making reference to essay authored by Justice Cardozo, which in fact summarizes the boundaries within which a court has to act while balancing the rights of parties within the four corners of law and to not sway away under the influence of plea of "justice" and "injustice". The observations of the court are as follows:-

23. The words "justice" and "injustice", in our view, are sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to different persons particularly to those arrayed on opposite sides. "One man's justice is another's injustice" [Ralph Waldo Emerson : Essays (1803-82), First Series, 1841, "Circles"]. Justice Cardozo said:"The web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and colours, the skeins irregular and broken. Many hues that seem to be simple, are found, when analysed, to be a complex and uncertain blend. Justice itself, which we are wont to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. Attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe them, have never wholly succeeded." (Selected Writings of Cardozo, pp. 223-24, Falcon Publications, 1947.)

24. While the man who succeeds may think justice is on his side, the man who loses is prone to think that injustice has been done to him. Most litigants who have not won, presume that injustice has been unreasonably inflicted upon them. Their approach is subjective and personalised. Therefore, this appeal by Shri Shanti Bhushan for "justice" can take us nowhere. The State and DDA which are on the other side are impersonal bodies and if they are exercising statutory powers for public good and acquiring land for public purposes, the Court has to balance the rights of parties and this has to be done within the four corners of the law. We are not lay courts meting out justice according to our whims and fancies but are governed by law as well as by binding precedent.

III. Any other sufficient reason

21. The third ground enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for seeking review is "any other sufficient reason". There is no definition provided for the term "any other sufficient reason". It is a general ground provided along with special grounds i.e., "discovery of new matter or evidence" and "mistake or error apparent of the face of record". For interpreting the general words, doctrine of ejusdem generis also known as Lord Tenterden's Rule, comes to the rescue. As per the said doctrine, when a list of specific words are being followed by the general words, the general words are interpreted in a way so as to restrict them to include the items or things which will be of same type as those of the specific words. The underlying principle behind the doctrine is that the color and context of the general words are to be derived from their context. Likewise, the expression "any other sufficient reason" when interpreted in view of aforesaid principle would mean such "sufficient reason" which is analogous to those specified immediately to it in the provision Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Chhajju Ram v. Neki and Ors, AIR 1922 PC 112, it was held by the Privy Council that analogy must be discovered between two grounds specified therein namely; (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; and (ii) error apparent on the face of record, before entertaining the review on any other sufficient ground.

22. In Moran Mar Basselios Chatholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, has interpreted words "any other sufficient reason" in the manner as follows:-

`.....It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean " a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule". See --- Chhajju Ram v. Neki', AIR 1922 Privy Council 112. This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in ---'Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath', AIR 1934 Privy Council 213 and was adopted by our Federal Court in --- 'Heri Shankar v. Anath Nath', AIR 1949 Privy Council 106 at pp. 110, 111. Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of ""mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" or some ground analogous thereto..'

23. The same view was reiterated in Debi Prasad and Ors. v. Khelawan and Ors., AIR 1957 All. 67; and Mohammad Hasan Khan v. Ahmad Hafis Ahmad Ali Khan and Anr., AIR 1957 Nag. 97 and thereafter in Lily Thomas (supra) wherein the court observed as under:-

`....58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case, (1995) 3 SCC 635 It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words "any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule" as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision...'

24. The principles as regards the scope and extent of review jurisdiction of the court, as also discussed above, have been summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others 2013 (8) SCC 320 and were reiterated by the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court as well, in the case of Columbia Holdings Pvt Ltd and others v. State of Haryana and others RA-CW-357 of 2015. The principles set out in various judicial precedents can be summarized as follows:-

A. Exercise of review jurisdiction is called for only in cases where one of the following grounds exists:

(i) When there is discovery of new and important matter or evidence, subject to the fulfillment of the following conditions:-

a. new matter/evidence discovered is of such nature which could change the judgment

b. such new matter/evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review

c. same could not be produced before court even after due diligence

(ii) When mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.

(iii) When there exists "any other sufficient reason", which is interpreted as analogous to the aforesaid two grounds.

B. The review jurisdiction is not exercisable on following grounds:-

(i) Only a "patent error" and not a "mere wrong decision" can be said to be an error apparent on the face of record.

(ii) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(iii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(iv) If a matter is required to be first reheard and then corrected, it would be an appeal under the guise of review

(v) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(vi) The power of review is to be exercised for "correction of mistake" and not for "substitution of view". Substitution of view would be the province of an appellate court.

(vii) Merely because a document which was forming part of the record was not considered at the time of deciding the case cannot be categorized as a mistake or error apparent on the face of record.

(viii) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(ix) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(x) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(xi) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.

(xii) Failure to argue a point at the time of hearing of the matter by the court, is also not a ground for seeking review as it would be a case where the existing material was overlooked by counsel and not a case of excusable misfortune or mistake.

25. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments and principles reveals that the scope of review jurisdiction is narrow. As was rightly summed up by Justice Krishna Iyer in Northern India caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1980 (2) SCC 167, "A plea for review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the moon". Therefore, unless and until there is patent error in the judgment delivered which is visible on the face of it, the review jurisdiction cannot be exercised.

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